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1.  Phillip Areeda 
Antitrust Policy in the 1980s 
Antitrust law influences the structure of markets as well as the conduct of busi- 
ness firms vis-84s their competitors, suppliers, and customers-for  example, 
by breaking up AT&T, jailing price fixers, limiting the way products and ser- 
vices are distributed, or questioning competitors’ joint research. The primary 
objective is low-cost production, competitive rather than monopoly or cartel 
levels of  output and  price,  and  advanced innovation and productivity.’ Of 
course, “undue” pursuit of competitive price levels today might obstruct inno- 
vations that would benefit consumers much more tomorrow, and overly zealous 
or otherwise misguided policy could defeat all these objectives. 
By the 1980s, antitrust interventions in the economy had reached that mis- 
guided state, in the view of Reagan administration, which set about to redress 
the matter. The chief antitrust administrator lectured Congress and the profes- 
sion on the errors of the past, stated the government’s intention not to enforce 
“foolish” doctrines, although they were “the law” as pronounced by the courts, 
and issued various policy statements and guidelines with that effect. The num- 
ber of lawyers in the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division was reduced by 
half over the decade, and its appropriations reflected a 30 percent decline in 
1. Few actual cases turn on the further question much discussed by  antitrust commentators: are 
the economic objectives  just stated the “exclusive” objective of antitrust law, or should those laws 
be used to promote “fairness” in, say, manufacturer-dealer  relationships or deconcentration  for its 
own sake? Similarly, few cases present a clear choice between transferring  income from consum- 
ers to producers and, on the other hand, reducing resource use, making resource allocation more 
efficient, and promoting innovation. Compare Areeda (1983) with Lande (1982) and Schwartz 
(1979). 
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1980 dollars.2  Federal Trade Commission (FTC) personnel and antitrust activi- 
ties also declined over the de~ade.~ 
As will appear in more detail below, the main current was efficiency. Today, 
few would use antitrust law to prevent the achievement of clear efficiencies (in 
any of the senses of that term), the importance of which has been driven home 
by international competition. 
In addition, many practices once regarded as generally sinister (such as tie- 
ins) are now seen to serve legitimate functions, at least in many circumstances. 
Indeed, the innocent explanation may predominate when greater economic so- 
phistication persuades us that the practice in question can increase market 
power only rarely. Furthermore, markets may become concentrated,  even down 
to a single firm, because large scale minimizes costs; nor will such markets 
exploit consumers when relatively easy entry makes the market “contestable.” 
The administration seemed to believe that substantial and durable barriers to 
entry were rare and that competition would generally prevail in the absence of 
naked price-fixing cartels or ill-advised government policies. 
While extensive private enforcement of  the antitrust laws continued, the 
courts also felt some of the same intellectual currents underlying the adminis- 
tration’s position, although not to the same degree or with any consistency. 
Since the late 1970s, the courts have qualified antitrust law’s “per se” prohibi- 
tions, tolerated more joint ventures among competitors and more restraints in 
buyer-seller arrangements, required clearer proof before characterizing price 
competition as “predatory,” recognized that antitrust suits could be used by 
some plaintiffs to chill competition, and increasingly understood that antitrust 
suits do raise general policy questions that should not be left to juries in the 
guise of finding the facts about who did what with what intention. Of course, 
any such broad statement of direction oversimplifies somewhat. 
We  shall see that courts are key players in antitrust policy and that they 
seldom state policy alternatives clearly. Indeed, judicial methods and tech- 
niques often focus on rulings about litigation procedures or the meaning of 
precedent, deemphasizing conscious policy choice. Moreover, the choices are 
the product of hundreds of judges, acting individually and not always con- 
sistently, notwithstanding a single Supreme Court atop the judicial pyramid. 
Nevertheless, trends do emerge. This paper will describe some of them, gener- 
ally praising the antitrust developments of the 1980s. 
Section 9.1 describes the antitrust players. Section 9.2 deals with the elimi- 
2. See Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Task Force on the Anti- 
trust Division of the US.  Department of Justice (1989). pp. I,  A2. 
3. See Report of  the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Special Committee to Study the Role of the 
Federal Trade Commission (1989), p. 28. Although the FTC has concurrent jurisdiction to enforce 
the antitrust laws (except for criminal prosecutions), this paper speaks of “the government” or “the 
administration” in terms  of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department because it simplifies 
the presentation without distorting the story of antitrust policy in the  1980s. Although the FTC is 
an  independent agency, its decisions during the decade have been largely congruent with those of 
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nation of competition through price-fixing conspiracies, the limited ability of 
antitrust law to cope with the cartel-like results that sometimes emerge in con- 
centrated markets, and the key antitrust policy of preventing mergers that so 
consolidate competitors as to create market concentration. Section 9.3 briefly 
treats other forms of cooperation among competitors that are allowed when 
“reasonable.” Section 9.4 discusses the ferment in buyer-seller agreements,  and 
section 9.5 considers the individual practices of actual or prospective monopo- 
lists, especially vertical integration and predatory pricing. 
Two related topics are not treated: regulated industries and the policies of the 
several states. Regulation might seem to occupy a separate domain in which 
competition is not  possible to protect consumers and promote innovation, 
while antitrust law prevails elsewhere. In fact, some markets without effective 
competition are unregulated, and the two regimes often cohabit a market in 
which competition is partly possible and partly not. This paper does not dis- 
cuss the degree to which regulation displaces antitrust policy or the degree to 
which antitrust principles influence regulators, although both were substan- 
tially affected by deregulation during the 1980s. 
Nor have I space for the role of the fifty states in antitrust policy, although 
that role is significant. First, each state is largely free to displace national com- 
petitive policy if it then supervises the private parties in~olved.~  Second, each 
state may enact its own antitrust law. Federal antitrust law is not understood to 
preempt the field to the exclusion of  state law, as federal labor law does, and 
the Supreme Court has not yet been ready to see specific conflicts that would 
oust state law.5 Third, state attorneys general may enforce the federal antitrust 
laws in federal court on behalf of their citizens. They became much more active 
during the 1980s in response to what they perceived as the antitrust laxity of 
the Justice Department-in  what has been called a “Balkanization” of  anti- 
trust policy.6 
9.1  The Players 
It is not Congress or the administration  but the courts that primarily develop, 
articulate, and enforce antitrust policy. Because their training, procedures, and 
methods differ greatly from those of other governmental organs, judges make 
4. See my Antitrust Law (Areeda 1978-),  chaps. 2B, 2B‘. There are currently nine volumes in 
this work, with D. Turner on vols. 1-3  (1978) and on vols. 4-5  (1980). Volumes 6-7  were pub- 
lished in 1986, vol. 8 in 1989, and vol. 9 in 1991. References marked by a prime (’) or a decimal 
point in the number are to the 1992 supplement (with H. Hovencampe). (Hereafter all references 
will be simply to Antitrust Law and will be mostly by paragraph numbers, which run sequentially 
through all volumes.) 
5. See, e.g., California v. ARC America, 490 US 93 (1989) (dealers buying from manufacturer 
cartel may recover, under federal law, three times the overcharge they paid even if they passed it 
all on to consumers; consumers recover nothing under federal law, but state law may allow them 
to recover from the same manufacturers  thrice the overcharge they paid the innocent dealers). 
6.  ABA Report (n. 3 above), p. viii. 576  Phillip Areeda 
policy with less economic or market knowledge. They are not always aware 
that they are creating national economic policy when they allow vaguely in- 
structed juries to decide key antitrust issues or when they review jury or lower 
court decisions in the light of prior judicial decisions. Let me explain briefly 
why courts have this preeminent antitrust role relative to legislators or adminis- 
trators and how judicial procedures and methods secrete industrial policy, often 
unconsciously. The curiosity is that it works as well as it does. 
American antitrust law is almost entirely a creature of the judges who gave 
content to the few vague words of the Sherman Act of  1890.7  The substantive 
provisions of that statute merely forbid “conspiracies in restraint of trade” and 
actual or attempted “monopolization.”  The Justice Department can initiate 
civil and criminal suits to enforce the antitrust laws, but its views do not bind 
the courts, whose jurisdiction can also be invoked by private parties seeking to 
forbid antitrust violations or recover treble damages for resulting injuries. With 
few exceptions, moreover, government officials have no power to immunize 
private conduct from the antitrust laws.9 
Nevertheless, the Justice Department has an important educational function. 
As an expert agency presumably motivated solely by the public interest, its 
arguments influence the courts, both when it sues and when it files an advisory 
brief in private litigation. It also influences business choices directly. Only a 
small fraction of business decisions affecting competition are ever litigated. In 
common with most laws, the antitrust laws are self-enforcing in that firms often 
consult their lawyers before acting and follow the advice they receive. That 
advice, in turn, reflects the lawyers’ estimate of the likelihood that the govern- 
ment or private parties will sue and their understanding of what the courts 
have done in the past and are expected to do in the future. Government policy 
statements thus affect the lawyers’ judgment on these questions as well as the 
degree to which businesses choose to consult their lawyers or to follow the 
advice they receive. Stern warnings by  the Justice Department reinforce this 
self-policing and voluntary compliance with the law, while publicly debunking 
past excesses tends to do the opposite.’” 
Of  course, Congress has the last word on the scope and application of the 
antitrust laws, but its amendments over the years have largely been confined to 
7. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.  $5 1-7  (1990). 
8. Even the somewhat more specific Clayton Act of 1914 applies only where the effects may be 
“substantially  to lessen  competition”-again,  an  undefined  concept.  38 Stat. 730 (1914).  as 
amended, 15 U.S.C.A. $8 12-27  (1990). The third relevant statute authorizes the Federal Trade 
Commission  to forbid  “unfair methods  of  competition.”  38 Stat. 717 (1914),  as amended  15 
U.S.C.A.  $$ 41-58  (1990). This undefined term has mainly been applied congruently with the 
Sherman Act. See Anfitrusf  Law, ¶ 307. 
9. In practice, however, a government decision not to attack a merger may amount to immunity, 
as explained later in this paper. 
10. See ABA Report  (n.  3 above), p.  viii,  expressing concern that the Department’s “non- 
enforcement rhetoric” during the 1980s  may have gone too far and threatened to ‘‘undermine self- 
policing and voluntary compliance with the law.” 577  Antitrust Policy 
procedural matters.” Congressional diffidence in antitrust matters reflects the 
usual difficulties of  mustering a sufficient consensus to “interfere” in what the 
courts do. Second, legislators may fear that pervasive antitrust legislation could 
open Pandora’s box, unleashing unknown expansions or contractions. In addi- 
tion, there is no agreement on what more detailed legislation would say. After 
all, the Sherman Act already speaks in those vague and general terms in which 
Congress so often legislates today (at least when it is not taxing or controlling 
Defense Department procurement). Finally, there is an astonishing degree of 
confidence in the courts as developers of antitrust law. In many respects, judi- 
cial rulings are icons that administrators flout at their peril.12 These reasons 
may explain why supplemental legislation has usually been very narrow. 
This preeminent judicial role complicates writing about antitrust policy in 
the 1980s. The readily dated legislative and executive players, who articulate 
their policy choices with relative clarity, tell only a portion of the story. The 
remainder is an undated mosaic of inferences drawn from many judicial deci- 
sions, which are not entirely consistent and which seldom articulate their im- 
plicit policy choices. Nevertheless, the judicial story connects to that of  the 
political branches in three ways. At the most general level, the economic condi- 
tions influencing political choices also come to the attention of judges in sev- 
eral forms: general reading, legal articles and treatises, expert witnesses, and 
arguments of the litigants. Second, judges sometimes accept the guidelines and 
other general pronouncements of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. 
Third, judges as well as administrators tend to reflect the general outlook of the 
president who chooses them. Although antitrust attitudes have not themselves 
determined the judicial  selection process, more of  the “liberal” judges  ap- 
pointed by  President Carter sympathized with antitrust plaintiffs, left issues 
to ultimate disposition by juries, and found more antitrust violations than the 
“conservative”  judges appointed by President Reagan. While any such correla- 
tion is loose indeed, one could expect to see less intrusive antitrust rulings over 
the Reagan years.I3 
Although these forces tend to push administrative and judicial developments 
in similar directions, very important differences remain: information pene- 
trates litigation more slowly than the political branches; judicial lawmaking is 
highly decentralized and thus develops slowly and inc~nsistently;‘~  judicial 
11. New legislation with respect to mergers, joint research ventures, and resale price mainte- 
nance is discussed below. We shall also see later that antitrust procedures have substantive signifi- 
cance. 
12. See, e.g., ABA Report (n. 3 above), pp. 19-21. 
13. In addition to his Supreme Court appointments, President Reagan made seventy-eight ap- 
pointments  to the Court of Appeals  and 290 to federal district courts, accounting for some 47 
percent of active federal judges in courts of general jurisdiction (see Goldman 1989). 
14. Although the Supreme Court can resolve differences among the lower courts, its own heavy 
caseload generally allows it to speak only after clear differences emerge in the lower courts, only 
episodically, and often only in delphic terms. 578  Phillip Areeda 
procedures often obscure policy issues and choices by emphasizing the facts 
of  the particular case and vague jury instructions; and, of  course, change is 
slowed by  such judicial values as following prior decisions and refusing to 
decide more than the narrowest issue that will dispose of a case. 
I now ask how these forces played out in and among the three branches for 
several antitrust areas. 
9.2  Price Fixing, Conspiracy, and Mergers 
Agreement on buying or selling prices among competitors has long been the 
central prohibition of every nation’s antitrust law, including our 0~n.I~  Nor has 
there been any change in this policy. Price fixers are consistently prosecuted. 
Unlike most antitrust offenders, moreover, price fixers suffer imprisonment 
and fines as well as treble damage liability to their victims.I6  In dispute is not 
this principle but the kinds of arrangements that should be classified as “price 
fixing” (as discussed in sec. 9.3 below) and the circumstances in which a con- 
spiracy (or “agreement”) among competitors can be inferred. It turns out that 
price leadership and related forms of tacit coordination among oligopolists are 
not considered “agreements” and thus are not prohibited by the Sherman Act 
even when cartel-like pricing results. However, antitrust law does address the 
mergers among competitors that create or reinforce oligopoly. Significant de- 
velopments have occurred on each of these subsidiary topics. 
9.2.1 
Because competitors agreeing on price seldom do so openly, antitrust law 
must often infer the existence of an agreement from circumstantial evidence. 
Whether the evidence warrants that inference is the most frequently litigated 
question in antitrust cases.”  An agreement is readily inferred when it alone 
explains the parties’ conduct-as  when they  simultaneously bid the same 
Conspiracy Generally and in Oligopoly 
15. Monopoly prices charged by  a single firm  are sometimes addressed by foreign laws, which 
authorize some administrative agency to forbid the “abuse of  a dominant position” (e.g., Article 
86 of the treaty creating the European Economic Community). By contrast, Section 2 of OUT Sher- 
man Act forbids “monopolization,”  which has been construed to address improprieties in obtaining 
or maintaining monopoly power but not the “mere” enjoyment of the fruits of a lawfully obtained 
monopoly. See Antitrusr Law, 99  710,710’. 
16. United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. ‘A  50,010 (1989). 
Criminal Fines Enforcement Act of 1984.98 Stat. 3136, 18 U.S.C.A. 5 3623 (1987), was the most 
recent increase of the fines under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The fines now are up to $250,000 
for violations committed by individuals and up to $1 million for violations committed by corpora- 
tions. The act also states that fines may exceed the stated limits up to the extent of twice the gross 
gain derived by  the defendant from the offense or twice the gross loss resulting to others, unless 
this “would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.” There have also been recent 
proposals to raise the maximum fines for violations of Section 1 to $10 million for corporations 
and to $350,000 for individuals. Antitrust Criminal Penalties Amendments of  1989, H.R. 3341, 
lOlst Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. H7089 (daily ed. 17 October 1989). 
17. See also sec. 9.4 on agreements between a manufacturer and its dealers. 579  Antitrust Policy 
amount on a novel, made-to-order product.’*  In less clear cases, three kinds of 
policy choices arise. 
The first, illustrating the connection between judicial procedures and sub- 
stantive policy, is the standard for allowing juries to find agreements. The pro- 
cedural question is whether the judge rules the evidence insufficient to go to 
the jury and therefore either grants “summary judgment” for the alleged con- 
spirators, dismissing the case before trial, or later “directs a verdict” of  no 
agreement. If not, the economy bears the heavier costs of lengthier trials, and 
juries are more likely than judges to indulge extralegal sympathy for the plain- 
tiff or antipathy to defendants and find agreements that did not really exist. The 
resulting treble damages impose heavy, unnecessary, and unproductive costs 
on doing business. On the other hand, undue generosity in granting summary 
judgments or directed verdicts could immunize actual conspirators and reduce 
the deterrence of  antitrust prohibitions, thereby burdening the economy with 
more illegal agreements than would otherwise occur. 
During the 1980s, the Supreme Court chose fewer jury trials, as illustrated 
by the contrast between the Poller case of 1962 and the Matsushita decision of 
1986. The later case disowned the former’s view that summary judgment was 
disfavored in antitrust cases and ruled that “conduct as consistent with permis- 
sible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support 
an inference of antitrust conspiracy.”’9  In effect, the Court emphasized that the 
plaintiff must show not only that the evidence is consistent with conspiracy 
but also that a reasonable juror could find that conspiracy was more likely 
than 
The second policy choice, also indirect if  not unaware, is suggested by the 
phrase “standing alone” in the last quotation. Some courts allowed inferences 
of  a price-fixing agreement when the defendants have not only charged the 
same prices but also engaged in some other joint, or even separate, conduct- 
such as disseminating past prices,21  telephoning each other to verify a buyer’s 
claim that a rival offered a lower price,”  agreeing to exchange the product 
with each other in kind (with adjustments for different qualities) while they 
simultaneously purchase that product from others,z3  or even separately publi- 
cizing price increases more widely than necessary to inform immediate cus- 
tomer~.~~  Because there is no way by which one can reason from the existence 
18. See Antitrust Law,  R  1425. 
19. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Matsushta Elec. Indus. Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,588 (1986). 
20. See Antitrust Law,  q[  1405‘. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the  suggestion by 
some lower courts that cases may be removed from the jury  when too complex for them (see 
ibid.,  q[ 315.1). 
21. American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 US. 377 (1921). 
22. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969). 
23. City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co. (Cal.), 872 F.  2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
24. Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 906 F.  2d 432 
110 S.  Ct. 1126 (1990). 
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2274 (1991). 580  Phillip Areeda 
of such activities to the presence of  a price-fixing agreement, such rulings in 
effect delegate to the jury or some other fact finder the policy choice that such 
activities should themselves be prohibited. Perhaps such activities should be 
prohibited because they  unnecessarily help oligopolists to coordinate their 
prices without agreeing on any price, and one might see a growing tendency 
to do  However, it is unwise to leave that policy choice to be made incon- 
sistently by juries in each case. 
The third policy choice concerns oligopolistic markets inhabited by only a 
few firms. Unlike more competitive markets, where each firm is too small to 
influence market prices by increasing its output until its marginal costs reach 
the market price, an oligopolist cannot increase its sales significantly except at 
lower prices. Its few rivals would then see the price cut or feel its impact and 
might be expected to match it. Nor will an oligopolist suffer by leading a price 
increase-especially  by  an advance announcement of a future increase-that 
can be quickly reversed if rivals do not follow. Such reversals mean that rivals 
cannot win greater volume by  remaining low and thus will follow when they 
conclude that higher industry prices will increase profits. Through such recog- 
nition of their mutual interdependence, oligopolists may “tacitly coordinate” 
at the same supracompetitive level that would result from a clearly illegal cartel 
agreement. When cartel-like prices  antitrust law asks whether such 
tacit coordination involves the agreement or “conspiracy”  that triggers Section 
I of the Sherman  Although wise antitrust policy might choose to address 
such oligopolies,28  the courts are constrained by the requirement in Section 1 
of the Sherman Act of an agreement that has not been satisfied by  mere tacit 
coordination (notwithstanding occasional Supreme Court language pointing 
the other way).29  The 1890 Congress hardly had oligopolistic coordination in 
mind. Although the Sherman Act has been extended far beyond the assump- 
tions of the original legislators, tacit coordination differs significantly from 
traditional agreements and may be less effective and therefore less dangerous. 
In addition, we must hesitate to impose the Sherman Act’s criminal or treble 
damage punishments on each oligopolist who independently sets his price in 
the light of  actual or anticipated reactions of  rivals and who can hardly do 
otherwise unless the judges administer prices or break up the firms.30  Antitrust 
25. See Antitrust Law,  ¶¶ 1406-7,  1435-36. 
26. They need not. For example, entry may be so easy that incumbents know that they cannot 
successfully maintain supracompetitive prices. Or each may suppose that it can win incremental 
volume with discounts hidden from rivals; if so, prices will fall to competitive levels. Or a price 
increase may be  so risky that no one firm  can afford to lead unilaterally-as  where “lumpy” 
orders are few but large and awarded on secret bids. For additional factors, see Antitrust Law, 
1425d-e,  1430. 
to the layman and thus obscures the very legal question in issue. 
kets, see Areeda and Kaplow (1988, ¶¶ 329-32). 
Law, I 1426. 
27. The economist’s term, tacit collusion, is best avoided here, for collusion connotes agreement 
28. For a brief discussion of typical legislative proposals to break up highly concentrated mar- 
29. See Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), which is explained in Antitrust 
30. For conflicting arguments on this point, see Antitrust Law,  ¶ 1432d+. 581  Antitrust Policy 
courts rightly abjure such day-to-day regulation, and an expansive reading of 
the agreement concept hardly seems a compelling mandate for wholesale re- 
structuring of the many oligopolistic markets by the courts. 
During the 1970s, the Antitrust Division threatened to bring cases urging 
the courts to reach mere oligopolistic  But nothing came of this initia- 
tive, which was abandoned during the  1980s. Instead, we have what might 
be called a two-step containment policy. One step limits certain practices that 
“facilitate” tacit coordination by  existing olig~polies.~~  The other prevents 
mergers concentrating markets in the first place. 
9.2.2  Mergers among Competitors 
A short history will illuminate the important merger policy decisions of the 
1980~~~  Because a merger necessarily embodies an agreement among the 
merging firms, Section 1 of the Sherman Act applies. The Justice Department 
used that statute to prevent a number of railroad mergers but little else. Section 
7 of the Clayton Act of 1914 specifically proscribed mergers whose effect may 
be substantially lessened competition, but narrow judicial constructions made 
it largely ineffective. Believing that many markets had become oligopolistic 
as a result of  mergers, Congress amended Section 7 in  1950. Although the 
amendments were rather technical in character, the courts perceived a mandate 
hostile to mergers. The Supreme Court condemned every merger that came 
before it during the 1960s, including those with postmerger shares of as little 
as 7.5 percent of an unconcentrated market in which entry was relatively easy. 
The cases were consistent, a dissenting Justice commented, only in that “the 
Government always wins.”34  The only Supreme Court case upholding a merger 
among competitors was a 1974 decision resting on the peculiarity in the coal 
industry that one of the merging firms had trivial reserves while virtually all 
its present sales merely implemented existing long-term  But even 
that case recognized that the number of significant firms in the market ap- 
peared to be the single best predictor of the likelihood of oligopolistic coordi- 
nation. 
All those cases were suits by the Justice Department. Although private par- 
ties can also attack mergers, they seldom do. If a merger created or reinforced 
oligopoly pricing, competitors would be benefited rather than injured. If  a 
merger, instead or in addition, created a more efficient firm that could injure 
rivals through more aggressive competition, they would be injured. Because 
3 1. See Department of Justice Budget Authorization (Antitrust Division): Hearing before Com- 
mittee on the Judiciary  of U.S. Senate to Consider Authorization of  FY79 Appropriations for 
Justice Department, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 77-129  (1978) (Statement of  John H.  Shenefield, 
assistant attorney general, Antitrust Division). 
32. For a few examples, see the fourth paragraph of this section. For a comprehensive analysis, 
see Antitrust Law, g”  1435-36. 
33. See ibid., ¶¶ 902-3. 
34. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966). 
35. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 582  Phillip Areeda 
that injury is not the kind that antitrust law is designed to prevent,36  however, 
rivals are not allowed to attack such a merger.37  Consumers are allowed to sue 
mergers injuring them, but the prospect of such injury is usually too remote to 
give rise to any immediate damages. That is, illegality usually rests not on any 
demonstrable  present impact but on the prophylactic concern that substantially 
increased concentration might lead to tacit price coordination in the future. 
Thus, however hostile the courts may be, most mergers will not be prevented 
unless the Justice Department chooses to sue.38  Prospective merger partners 
usually abandon projects to which the Justice Department objects or modify 
them to eliminate government objections, consummating only those that are 
not likely to be attacked. Hence, Justice Department policy largely determines 
the number and character of mergers. 
The Justice Department recognized its preeminent role in this area by prom- 
ulgating “guidelines” indicating how it will exercise its discretion to sue. Its 
1968 guidelines declared that the government would ordinarily sue where the 
merging parties accounted for as little as 8 percent of a concentrated market in 
which the leading four firms had 75 percent of the business; combined shares 
of  10 percent would suffice in less concentrated markets. Factors other than 
market shares would be considered only in “exceptional circumstances.” Not 
surprisingly, competitors seldom merged during the 1970s. The Reagan years 
brought a major change with the issuance of new guidelines that were much 
more hospitable to mergers through wider market definitions, higher thresh- 
olds of  concern, and openness to many nonstructural fact01-s.~~ 
Many antitrust issues, including mergers, turn on market power. Monopoli- 
zation under Section 2 of the Sherman Act implicates monopoly, which is un- 
derstood to be substantial market power. Productive  joint ventures among com- 
petitors  are  usually  ignored  when  the  collaborators lack  market  power. 
Similarly, a merger concerns us when it creates a monopoly for the merging 
firmsm or, more commonly, creates or reinforces the potential for tacit price 
coordination with rival firms. To make all these assessments, we need to iden- 
36. The requirement of so-called antitrust injury is an important, and largely unheralded, recent 
judicial development. It forces the courts to articulate the rationale for the antitrust prohibition 
allegedly violated by the defendant and thereby forces judges to go behind antitrust  jargon, giving 
more conscious attention to the antitrust policies implicated by  a suit. See, e.g., Antitrust Law 
¶ 1640. 
37. Cargill v.  Monfort, 479 U.S. 104 (1986). The lower courts are divided as to the standing of 
a target firm to challenge a hostile takeover bid that would allegedly injure consumers. See Anti- 
trust Law,  ¶ 340.21. 
38. The Federal Trade Commission Act can also institute its own proceedings to prevent merg- 
ers, although it has generally followed the same policies as the Justice Department. See FTC 
Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. ¶13,200  (1988). 
39. As issued in 1982 and refined in 1984, the guidelines are reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 
13, 103 (1992). The guidelines were further refined in 1992. See id. at ¶ 13, 104. 
40. Although rare today,  monopoly-creating mergers were the turn-of-the-century  (and later) 
objects of Standard Oil, American Tobacco, U.S. Steel, and others. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. 
United States, 221 U.S.  1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 US. 106 (1911); 
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tify the  relevant rivals-that  is, the  “relevant market”-and  its  structure. 
Market definition is superfluous when exercised market power has been re- 
vealed by persistently excessive price-cost margins or profits. However, such 
direct measurements of exercised market power have usually seemed too elu- 
sive for antitrust litigation, and, in any event, past prices or profits do not tell 
us whether a merger or some other development creates a new potential for 
individual power or tacit coordination. Accordingly, the courts usually rely on 
large market shares as the indicator of power and on market structure as the 
indicator of oligopolistic coordination. 
The new merger guidelines clarify the government’s market definition meth- 
odology and also offer quantitative  benchmarks. As a first cut, the government 
groups all geographically proximate producers of the merging firms’ product 
into a hypothetical cartel and asks whether it could profitably maintain signifi- 
cantly higher prices for a significant time period-defined  ordinarily as 5 per- 
cent for one year-without  losing too many sales to other producers. If  so, 
the first-cut market is the relevant market for antitrust purposes. If  not, the 
hypothetical cartel is expanded to the next most similar product (or adjacent 
region), and the same question is asked until an affirmative answer is obtained. 
This generally sensible methodology probably defines broader markets than 
more intuitive practices found in many antitrust cases and would make even 
more transparent the obviously gerrymandered markets seen in some antitrust 
cases:’  Working in the same direction are the 5 percent and one-year specifi- 
cations.  Although  arbitrary, they  offer  greater  certainty  to  planners  and 
c0urts,4~  notwithstanding the customary absence of  sufficient data for clear 
results. Finally, the guidelines always generate an unduly wide market when 
the firm(s) producing a particular product in a particular region already charge 
a profit-maximizing monopoly price. In that event, any price increment would 
necessarily be unprofitable, with the result that the government would widen 
the m~ket.4~  The effect of widening a market beyond product X, of course, is 
to increase the number of firms and to reduce the shares of all X producers and 
thus ordinarily to allow mergers.& 
The new guidelines are also more tolerant in their numerical thresholds. The 
government and the courts traditionally looked at the shares of the merging 
41. See, e.g., United States v.  Aluminum Co. of America (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271 (1964); 
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 US.  441 (1964). 
42. The courts have not generally adopted these guidelines. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil 
Corp., 530 F.  Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aff‘d, 669 E 2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 US. 
982 (1982) (local area is relevant market even though prices differ only by  1 percent from those 
nearby). 
43. The implied indifference to mergers reinforcing preexisting tacit coordination is not, I be- 
lieve, sound merger policy, although the guidelines are supported by  the practical difficulty of 
learning whether premerger prices were competitive or monopolistic. 
44. Of course, widening a market to X + Y would transform a merger of X and Y producers into 
one of competitors. Second, widening a market could bring in a relatively large firm  (although not 
one of the merging parties), which is greatly emphasized by the government’s concentration mea- 
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parties and at an aggregation of the leading four (or eight or more) firms. Be- 
cause that aggregation might be shared equally by  the leading firms or held 
almost entirely by one, and because it tells nothing about the remaining firms, 
the government now  uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measure, 
which expresses market concentration as the sum of the squares of each firm’s 
market  Including every firm is desirable but requires more data than 
are usually available. Squaring shares emphasizes differences among firms- 
perhaps too much so-and  magnifies errors in measuring each firm’s share. 
The guidelines profess indifference apart from extraordinary circumstances 
to markets in which a postmerger HHI remains below  1,000, concern above 
that level, and great concern above 1,800.46  However, neither concern nor great 
concern triggers further consideration unless the merger raises the index 100 
or 50 points, respectively4’  For example, merging two 7 percent firms does not 
trigger these guidelines even though the market has only five other equally 
sized 
In a substantial retreat from earlier cases and guidelines, exceeding these 
numerical thresholds “provide[s] only the starting point for analyzing the com- 
petitive impact of a merger.”49  Unless the HHI exceeds 1,800 and rises by more 
than 100 points, the Justice Department will weigh several additional factors 
diminishing the dangers to competition: the likelihood of  significant entry 
within two years, the expansion potential of efficient fringe firms, worldwide 
excess capacity that could supply us, the quality of the next best substitute or 
region not included within the relevant market, extreme product heterogeneity, 
or impaired resources or financial condition suggesting that a firm’s market 
share overstates its competitive signifi~ance.~~  In all events, the government 
will tolerate otherwise anticompetitive mergers that are shown by  clear and 
convincing evidence to be reasonably necessary to achieve significant net effi- 
ciencie~.~’  Notwithstanding some expansion in the scope of antimerger legisla- 
ti~n,~~  the government allowed many mergers during the 1980s that it would 
45. Dropping decimal points, as the government does, a 10 percent firm enters the HHI index 
as 10 X  10 = 100. So a market with ten 10 percent firms has an HHI of 1,000. A one-firm market 
has 10,000. 
46. These numbers correspond roughly to four-firm concentration ratios of 50 and 75 percent, 
respectively (see Weinstock 1984). 
47. Additional concern arises under the guidelines when any market’s leading firm with at least 
a 35  percent share acquires even a 1 percent firm. 
48. The postmerger HHI would be 1,675, raised 98 points ([14 X  141 -  49 -  49) by the merger. 
49. Guidelines, 0 3.11. 
50. The guidelines also note several factors that would exacerbate the threat to competition: 
restraints on expansion of foreign exports (if included within the relevant market); product homo- 
geneity; ready information about rivals; orders frequent, regular, and small rather than lumpy; past 
collusion; mandatory delivered pricing and other standardized transactions; stable market shares; 
or acquisition of any unusually disruptive and competitive firm. Guidelines, $3 3.2-3.45. 
5 1. The guidelines also allow otherwise forbidden acquisitions of failing companies or  divi- 
sions, as did the cases and earlier guidelines. Guidelines, $0 5. 
52. Amendments in 1980 covered more local acquisitions as well as those involving partnerships 
and proprietorships in addition to corporations. 94 Stat. 1154, 1157-58  (1980). Congress did not 
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have challenged in preceding decades.53  Of the more than 10,000 merger pro- 
posals reported to the enforcement agencies from 1982 to  1986, the Justice 
Department announced an intention to challenge eighty-one, and twenty-five 
more were abandoned after the FTC requested additional information or au- 
thorized further enf~rcement.~~  Mergers not involving competitors appear not 
to have been challenged at all-another  departure from the 1960s. 
With few government suits, the courts had little occasion to decide the legal- 
ity of  mergers during the  1980s. In one private suit, a court condemned a 
merger on  the conventional ground that  it increased concentration unduly, 
raising the postmerger share to around 20 percent where the largest four firms 
held about half the rather narrow market defined by the  And several 
FTC condemnations of mergers were upheld.56  A few decisions, however, were 
even more tolerant than the government and refused to condemn mergers be- 
cause the court believed that entry was relatively easy.57 
Speaking generally, these developments reflect the view that mergers are 
both less dangerous and more beneficial than they had seemed. Unless govern- 
ment itself blocks entry, the enforcement agencies came to believe that compet- 
itive forces are too robust to be defeated by most mergers. Even with substan- 
tial  concentration,  it  was  far  from  clear  that  concentration  was  closely 
correlated with high profits throughout the market, which would presumably 
be the result of supracompetitive prices. Indeed, suggestions that only the lead- 
ing firms earned higher profits in concentrated markets might imply that en- 
hanced efficiency was the object and result of  growth, whether by  internal 
expansion or by merger.58 
tive effects rather than a tendency in that direction, (2) forbid only those mergers that “substan- 
tially increase the ability to exercise market power” rather than those that may “substantially lessen 
competition” or tend to create a monopoly, and (3) direct courts to consider six economic factors 
such as the number and size distribution of firms, conditions of entry, and, notably, efficiencies. 
53. Of ninety-four mergers condemned by the courts during the 1960s and 1970s (as set forth 
in Antitrust Law, ¶ 909) at least twenty-nine would not have been challenged under the new guide- 
lines, according to Kauper (1984, 174, n. 8). 
54. 54 Antitr. & Trade Reg. Rep. 476-77  (1988). See also Conference Board Seminar Examinev 
Enforcement, Restructuring Trends, 52 Antitr. & Trade Reg. Rep. 535, 541 (1987) (as of  1987, 
apparently no suits challenging mergers with an HHI below 1,800 and perhaps not even below 
2,000 or even 2,200); Scherer (1989.91) (‘‘Many  mergers that almost surely would have drawn a 
challenge from past administrations were let through; and the number of challenges issued per 
year by the two enforcement agencies declined by half relative to 1960-1980  averages despite all- 
time peak levels of merger activity”). 
55. Monfort v.  Cargill, 761 F.  2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 479 US. 104 
(1986). 
56. See, e.g., Hospital Corp. of America v.  FTC, 807 F. 2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
481 U.S. 1038 (1987) (approving condemnation of merger where regulation limited entry); FTC 
v. Warner Communic., 742 F.  2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984) (using concentration ratios rather than HHI 
and emphasizing a trend toward concentration);  FTC v.  Coca-Cola, 641 E Supp.  1128 (D.D.C. 
1986),  vacated after merger abandoned, 829 F. 2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
57. United States v. Syufy, 903 F.  2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.  Waste Management, 
743 F.  2d 976, 981-84  (2d Cir. 1984). 
58. A significant portion of the literature on the connection between structure and performance 
is effectively summarized by Scherer and Ross (1990, chap. 9). 586  Phillip Areeda 
9.3  Other Cooperation among Competitors 
The courts have long condemned “price fixing” as illegal per se-that  is, 
without proof of detrimental effects or actual market power and without con- 
sidering justifications. This category came to include competitors who, al- 
though setting no price, agreed to divide markets, to buy at market prices the 
“excess” supply offered by weaker rivals unable to store it, to rotate bids, to 
charge only one’s published prices (although free to publish a new price list at 
any time), or to eliminate certain discounts or bidding  practice^.^^ 
Once such practices were identified as per se illegal “price fixing,” private 
plaintiffs and occasionally the government attempted so to label almost any 
agreement that could eliminate price competition among competitors. Even 
the most procompetitive joint venture between two tiny firms could eliminate 
price competition among them and, if  they became more efficient and ex- 
panded, might even come to have some impact on the market; although the 
latter  impact  seems  desirable,  the  law  purports  to  forbid  price-fixing 
agreements regardless of whether higher or lower prices result.m 
Because so inclusive a definition of price fixing would condemn arrange- 
ments that had little in common with the traditionally unjustified cartels, the 
courts have never defined per se  illegal price fixing as broadly as plaintiffs 
desire. Yet only recently did the Supreme Court expressly say that the categori- 
cal condemnation of “price fixing” does not actually cover all “  ‘price fixing’ 
in the literal sense.” “Literalness is overly simplistic and often overbroad,” the 
Court explained, and does not dispense with the need to examine potential 
harms and benefits in order “to characterize the challenged conduct as falling 
within or without that category of behavior to which we apply the label ‘per  se 
price fixing.’  ’W Thus, except where they have already considered and rejected 
claimed justifications-such  as a cartel’s claim that “cutthroat” competition 
deprives its members of deserved returns-the  courts remain ready to consider 
appropriate justifications. Where the challenged conduct is of a kind that can 
benefit the economy, the courts turn from per se rules to the so-called rule of 
reason, which declines to interfere with minor restraints and which allows 
more significant restraints to be “redeemed” by lower costs, greater innovation, 
corrections of market failures, and the like. 
Speaking broadly, I perceive a greater receptivity, both in the courts and in 
the administration,  to claims of redeeming virtue-especially  cost savings and 
innovation potential. Collaborators have themselves become readier to offer 
affirmative justifications rather than merely rest on an objector’s failure to 
prove a significant threat to competition. More important, our attitudes have 
changed pervasively since mid-century. Once overwhelmingly dominant in the 
59. See Antitrust Analysis, 99 227-28. 
60.  Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,  457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
61. Broadcast Music v.  Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979). See also North- 
west Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,290-91  (1985). 587  Antitrust Policy 
world, our industries seemed invulnerable and the primary suppliers of Ameri- 
can consumers, with continued productivity growth inevitable. If antitrust law 
then erred on the side of preserving rivalry at the expense of efficiency, the 
possible sacrifice might appear minor and short lived. More recently, growing 
imports challenged many  basic industries, creating the specter of industrial 
decline and demonstrating that efficiency and innovation are not inevitable but 
must be achieved. 
Although the cases are too few and their language too oblique for clear proof 
without a more detailed presentation than this paper allows, most commenta- 
tors would agree that the courts have become more hospitable to claims of 
efficiency. And Congress favored cooperation both on research and on exports. 
Responding in 1984 to suggestions that the antitrust laws impeded the joint 
research needed to maintain the competitiveness of U.S. industry against in- 
creasing foreign competition, Congress passed the National Cooperative Re- 
search Act with three features.62  Although largely declaratory of existing law, 
it eliminated any doubt that joint research and development ventures were to be 
judged under the rule of reason, “taking into account all relevant facts affecting 
competition.” In addition, any such venture that was ultimately held to be un- 
lawful would give rise only to actual damages rather than the usual treble dam- 
ages for antitrust violations if the venturers had promptly notified the Justice 
Department and the Federal Trade Commission of their identities and of the 
nature and objectives of the venture. Finally, contrary applications of state law 
were forbidden.63 
On the export front, the Webb-Pomerene Act long exempted from the anti- 
trust laws agreements or acts in the course of export trade by associations en- 
tered into for the sole purpose of engaging in such trade.64  Congress went fur- 
ther  with  the  Export Trading  Company  Act  of  1982 to  favor  expanded 
cooperation to promote exports.65  It eliminated any doubt that our antitrust 
laws served to protect U.S. consumers and exporters rather than foreign con- 
sumers or producers. Those laws  were  declared inapplicable to  “conduct 
involving . . . commerce (other than import trade . . .) with foreign nations- 
unless such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable ef- 
fect” (1) on domestic or import trade or (2) “on export . . .  commerce . . . of a 
person . . . in the United States.”66 
The act also allows the secretary of commerce, with the concurrence of the 
attorney general, to certify that specific export trade or activities or methods of 
62.98  Stat. 1815 (1984), 15 U.S.C.A. $5 4301-5  (1990). 
63. Additional legislative proposals favoring certain joint production as well as joint research 
ventures are currently pending. See, e.g., National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1990, 
H.R. 4611, l0lst  Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. H3099 (daily ed. 5 June 1990); Defense Produc- 
tion Act reauthorization for four years, S. 1379, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. S8602 
(daily ed. 24 July  1989). 
64.40  Stat. 516 (1918), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. $5 61-65  (1990). 
65. 96 Stat. 1233 (1982). 
66. In the latter event, only “injury to export business in the United States” is cognizable. 588  Phillip Areeda 
operation will not (1) lessen competition with the United States; (2)  restrain 
any competitors’ export trade; (3) unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress 
prices within the United States of goods of the class exported; (4) constitute 
unfair methods of competition against export competitors; or (5) “include any 
act that may reasonably be expected to result in the sale for consumption or 
resale within the U.S. of the goods . . .  or services exported.” Such a certificate 
immunized the recipient from criminal or civil antitrust liability under state or 
federal law, except that an injured person may obtain injunctive relief or single 
damages for violation of  the listed standards (other than the last). In such a 
suit, it will be presumed that “conduct which is specified in and complies with 
a certificate . . .  does comply with [those] standards.” 
9.4  “Vertical” Relationships between Buyer and Seller 
Although “horizontal” collaboration among rivals can harm or benefit the 
economy more  substantially than  “vertical” restraints involving buyers and 
sellers, the latter have been litigated more often and discussed more passion- 
ately. Entrenched doctrine opposing such restraints continued to weaken dur- 
ing the 1980s with the growing perception that suppliers can seldom increase 
their market power through vertical restraints and, hence, must often adopt 
them to make distribution more efficient. More vocal reformers say “never” 
rather than “seldom” and “always” rather than “often.” In their view, minor 
exceptions for readily observed facts take care of such anticompetitive vertical 
agreements as those that a manufacturer adopted only because compelled to 
do so by a cartel of its dealers themselves. Others doubt that the exceptions are 
minor or that their occurrence can be easily seen. Vocal traditionalists doubt 
that genuine efficiencies are often involved, insist that any efficiencies can usu- 
ally be obtained in other ways, and, in any event, favor antitrust protection of 
“small” dealer autonomy against “oppressive”  manufacturer^.^' To  illustrate 
these forces more concretely, let us turn to restraints on a dealer’s resale and to 
tie-ins-conduct  that the Reagan administration largely blessed, decrying ear- 
lier overenforcement. 
9.4.1  Resale Limitations 
Still in force is the 191  1 Dr. Miles ruling that categorically condemned man- 
ufacturer-dealer agreements specifying dealers’ resale prices.68  Seeing no le- 
gitimate manufacturer interest beyond the wholesale price, the Supreme Court 
equated the vertical agreement’s elimination of  intrabrand price competition 
among dealers with the clearly illegal horizontal agreement among dealers 
themselves to eliminate such competition. Of course, manufacturer interests in 
67. For extensive analysis of  these themes in the context of vertical agreements limiting a deal- 
68. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.  John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
er’s resale prices, customers, or territories, see Antitrust Law,  chap. 16A. 589  Antitrust Policy 
distribution do not end at the wholesale level. Resale price maintenance might 
induce dealers to provide greater services than otherwise and thereby expand 
sales volume more than lower resale prices.69  Moreover, horizontal and vertical 
price-fixing agreements differ. A dealer cartel seeks maximum profits for its 
members, while greater dealer profit than required for effective distribution 
injures the manufa~turer.~~  Nevertheless, much actual resale price maintenance 
has apparently resulted from dealer pressure.71 
During the 1980s, the Justice Department unsuccessfully urged the Supreme 
Court to reconsider the per se prohibiti~n’~  and later issued guidelines indicat- 
ing  that  it would  seldom attack resale price mainter~ance.’~  Congressional 
forces, on the other hand, have sought to legislate continued per se prohibi- 
ti~n.~~  In all events, the categorical prohibition of  191  1 
However, the Supreme Court recently ameliorated that prohibition by  ex- 
panding the more lawful “nonprice” category in Business  electronic^^^ and by 
returning to a narrower definition of vertical “agreement” in M~nsanto.~’ 
Price or Nonprice Restraints 
Vertical agreements confining dealers to certain territories or customers- 
so-called nonprice re~traints~~-also  reduce or eliminate intrabrand competi- 
tion, and not just on price, but on service as well. Moving toward per  se illegal- 
ity in the mid-l960s, the Supreme Court abruptly changed course in the late 
1970s, ruling in Sylvania that such restraints did not appear so pernicious and 
69. For circumstances  bearing on whether dealers themselves would provide such services with- 
70. See id. at q[ 1603 
71. Although this has never been true of  agreements imposing a ceiling on resale prices, the 
Supreme Court has unwisely condemned those agreements as well. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 
U.S. 145 (1968). Nevertheless, it has refused to allow challenges of ceiling-price agreements by 
competitors of the restrained dealers. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co.,  110 S. Ct. 1884 
(1990). Moreover, the lower courts have  narrowed  the  concept  of  forbidden maximum  price 
agreements. See Antitrust Law,  ¶ 1639. 
72. See Monsanto Co. v.  Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761-62  n.7 (1984). Curiously, 
an appropriations rider forbade the Department of Justice from pursuing that argument. Depart- 
ments of Commerce, Justice, and State,  the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-116,  Q 510,97 Stat. 1071, 1102-3  (1983). 
73. Justice Department, Guidelines for Vertical Restraints (1985), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 13, 105 
(1990). 
74. Price Fixing Prevention Act of  1989, H.R. 1236, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. 
HI538 (daily ed. 18 April 1990). 
75. During the Great Depression, Congress responded to lobbying by  dealers against severe 
retail price competition by enacting an antitrust exemption for resale price maintenance in states 
that chose to permit it. 50 Stat. 673,693 (1937). When Congress repealed that exemption in 1975, 
it assumed-but  did not enact-continuedper  se prohibition. 89 Stat. 801 (1975). For an analysis 
of that legislation, see Antitrust Law, ¶ 1629. 
76. Business Elec. Corp. v.  Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). For other exclusions from 
the vertical price-fixing concept, see Antitrust Law,  pars. 1473-74,  1622-27. 
77. See n. 72 above. 
78. This category also includes agreements prescribing dealer hours, inventories, services, etc. 
out vertical price fixing, see Antitrust Law,  fl  161  Iff. 590  Phillip Areeda 
so lacking in redeeming virtue to warrant categorical pr~hibition.’~  After all, 
limiting intrabrand competition might facilitate new entry or services strength- 
ening competition with other brands. Of course, such restraints are unlawful 
when unreasonable, but few plaintiffs have been willing or able so to prove.xo 
The Sylvania Court acknowledged that resale price maintenance might also 
strengthen intrabrand competition but expressly disclaimed any retreat from 
Dr. Miles because price restrictions might impede interbrand price competi- 
tion (by preventing dealers from cutting retail price in competition with other 
brands or by  helping rival manufacturers monitor each other’s  pricing and 
thereby facilitating their tacit price coordination) and because per se prohibi- 
tion here was assumed by Congressx’  and was so venerable.x2  This reluctance 
to overrule old precedents is obviously less potent in the legislative and execu- 
tive branches. 
In all events, this sharp distinction between price and nonprice restraints- 
condemning the former per se while usually allowing the latter as reason- 
able-makes  the classification of  actual restraints critical. For example, one 
dealer complains that a rival has disobeyed an express territorial restriction 
by  selling in the complainer’s region. The manufacturer’s subsequent steps to 
discipline this invader have readily been classified as nonprice restraints even 
though the complaint emphasized the invader’s low prices. In the absence of 
an express nonprice restraint, however, how should we classify the termination 
of a price cutter in response to complaints of another dealer? Assuming that 
the manufacturer had agreed with the complainer to terminate the plaintiff be- 
cause of the plaintiff‘s low prices, the Supreme Court nevertheless classified 
the restraint as nonprice in the absence of an agreement prescribing some deal- 
er’s resale 
Refusals to Deal as Agreements 
Vertical restraints not involving an actual or prospective monopolist are not 
covered by the Sherman Act in the absence of an agreement. The core concept 
is relatively clear in the horizontal area where cooperation among competitors 
creates power that did not otherwise exist. In the vertical area, by  contrast, a 
manufacturer  needs no promise or commitment from a dealer but might simply 
announce publicly that dealers reselling for less than list price would no longer 
be  supplied. Recognizing the absence of  any commitment by  dealers and 
seeing only the manufacturer’s choice of  customers, the Colgate case found 
no agreements4  Recognizing the resulting toleration of resale price control by 
manufacturers, the courts retreated from Colgate and condemned threats or 
termination based on resale prices, allowing only suggestions or persuasion. 
79. Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 US. 36 (1977). 
80. See Antitrust Law, q 1645. 
8  1. See n. 75 above. 
82.433 US. (n. 79 above) at 51 11.18. 
83. Business Elec., n. 76 above. 
84. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 591  Antitrust Policy 
In 1984, Monsanto forbade the inference of agreement merely from a manu- 
facturer’s termination of a discounter in response to a rival dealer’s price com- 
plaint and used language resurrecting C~lgate,~~  although the Court actually 
upheld a jury finding of agreement based on rather weak evidence. 
Congressional response has been no better. Proposed legislation insists that 
mere termination of  a price cutter after complaint of a rival dealer prevents 
summary judgment for suppliers and would sustain any jury verdict of illegal 
vertical price fixing.86  It seems shameful to rule or legislate in terms of  the 
procedural issue of  when  or what juries  may  decide without defining the 
agreement concept suitable for these vertical cases. Neither Congress nor 
the courts have focused on that policy 
9.4.2  Tie-ins 
The courts first encountered tie-ins in the course of defining patent infringe- 
ment. Use of a patented machine without license from the patent holder is, of 
course, an infringement. When a patent holder licensed use of his patented 
machine only in connection with approved materials, he claimed that any other 
use of the machine was unlicensed and therefore an infringement. The courts 
typically upheld such restrictions until the 1917 Motion Picture Patents case 
considered a monopolist of motion picture projectors who allowed use of those 
machines only to project films approved by the monopolist;  there was no doubt 
that these restrictions were part of an effort by established machine and movie 
makers to exclude rival movie makers from the market.88 
The Court held that violation of the license restriction did not infringe the 
patent. Indeed, during the pendency of  such a “misuse,” the courts refuse 
to enforce a patent against an undoubted infringer.89  Believing that tie-ins 
typically disrupted competition in  the  tied  product  without  any  offsetting 
legitimate function, the courts also came to condemn them as per se antitrust 
 violation^.^^  Moreover, the courts expressed hostility to possible justifica- 
tions, for tie-ins “serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competi- 
ti~n.”~’ 
The law might have rested there in the absence of a typical overextension. 
To win treble damages without having to demonstrate any real power or effect, 
inventive plaintiffs succeeded in sweeping an ever larger number and type of 
85. 465 US.  at 764, 763, and n.9. 
86. Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1989, H.R. 1236, l0lst Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. 
87. For an extensive analysis of these several issues, see Anritrusr Law, chap. 14D. 
88. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). See Antitrust 
89. Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
90. Although the customary verbal formula seemed to require some power in the tying-product 
market and some effect in the tied market, the former was inferred from the  tie itself, and the 
latter was satisfied by a nontrivial dollar volume of trade, no matter how small the percentage of 
trade affected. 
91. United States v. Loew’s, 371 U.S. 38, 44 (1962), citing Standard Oil Co. of California v. 
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-6  (1949). 
H1538 (daily ed. 18 April 1990). 
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business arrangements into the tying category, such as a fast-food franchise 
coupled with ready-to-operate premises or an automobile from a manufacturer 
with delivery arranged by the seller.92  Such cases illustrate how far tying law 
strayed from any intelligible concern with the preservation of competition. Not 
only do these examples stretch the core idea of a two-product tie-in, but they 
involve antitrust intervention without any noticeable threat to the health of 
competition in any market. 
With this thoughtless expansion, many courts came to see that arguable tie- 
ins are to be found everywhere, that many of  them actually serve legitimate 
objectives without threatening competitive vitality in the second market or 
anywhere else and without even harming the plaintiff buyer. So the retreat be- 
gan. A few courts allowed “business justifications” as affirmative defenses to 
tie-ins, notwithstanding the language of per se illegality.93  Others held that the 
alleged tying and tied products were really a single product, which then fell 
entirely outside tying law. While many of  those “single-product’’ rulings re- 
flected genuine doubt about a product’s metaphysical boundaries, others re- 
flected a belief that antitrust law should remain aloof, either because the ar- 
rangement was justified94  or surely without harmful impact on the market.95 
The Supreme Court came to require actual proof of power with respect to the 
tying product rather than simply inferring it from the existence of  the tie.96 
Finally, some lower courts have moved slightly toward requiring plaintiffs to 
show that the tie could bring the defendant market power in the tied market,’” 
and a growing number of them realize that the injuries claimed by the typical 
plaintiff-buyers  forced to take a second product-are  usually an illusion.98 
Although the Supreme Court insists that tie-ins are unlawful per se,  it de- 
mands real proof of power over the tying product and does not preclude proof 
of  redeeming virtues. Its per se rule thus precludes examination of  the only 
factor that matters-namely,  whether there is any substantial impact on the 
health of competition in the tied market. A minority of the Justices recognize 
that this per se rule does not simplify antitrust admini~tration.~~  Indeed, a sen- 
sible law of tie-ins would focus primarily, if not solely, on effects in the tied 
market  and  redeeming  virtues,  ignoring complex characterizations of  one 
92. Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.  2d  1336, 1347 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1097 (1977). Anderson Foreign Motors v.  New England Toyota Distrib., 475 F.  Supp. 973 
(D. Mass. 1979). 
93. For example, United States v.  Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F.  Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.  1960),  aff‘d 
per curium, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). 
94. For example, Principe v. McDonald’s Corp., 631 F.  2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980),  cert. denied, 451 
U.S. 970 (1981). 
95. For example, Coniglio v. Highland Servs., 495 F.  2d  1286 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
1022 (1974). 
96. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
97. For example, Carl Sandburg Village Condominium  Assn. v. First Condominium  Devel. Co., 
98. See Antitrust Law,  1  340.4a. 
99. See Jefferson Parish (n. 96 above) at 32 (concumng opinion). 
758 F. 2d 203, 210 (7th Cir. 1985). See Antitrust Law ch. 17B-2. 593  Antitrust Policy 
product or two and ignoring power in the tying product. This is a likely course 
of  development, toward which the 1980s decisions demanding real proof of 
power are only a minor step. 
Although the Justice Department of the  1980s would largely agree with 
these sentiments, it had relatively little impact on the law. To be sure, it issued 
policy statements withdrawing earlier objections to various patent license re- 
strictions,lm  and it did not institute suit, but private suits in this area are nu- 
merous. 
9.5  One Firm’s Low Prices or Vertical Integration 
The actual or prospective monopolist is my final substantive topic, one with 
significant administrative and judicial developments during the 1980s, particu- 
larly as to vertical integration and allegedly predatory pricing. 
9.5.1  Vertical Integration and the Bell System 
The most notorious antitrust policy decision of the decade was the breakup 
of the Bell telephone system, separating AT&T’s research, equipment manu- 
facture, and long-distance operations from its Bell operating company (BOC) 
monopolies of local telephone exchanges and the organization of the latter into 
seven regional monopolies, which made no equipment and affiliated with no 
long-distance firm.  lol The players were the Antitrust Division, which initiated 
the suit against AT&T in the mid-1970s; the district judge, whose preliminary 
opinion indicated that AT&T would be found guilty of  illegal monopoliza- 
tion;lo2  and, of course, AT&T, which consented to the breakup without a full 
trial and appeals to higher courts. Let me summarize briefly the theory of the 
government’s AT&T suit and hypothesize rationales for each player’s position. 
For simplicity, I will focus on the equipment issue. 
AT&T  supplied the BOCs with equipment. They “purchased over eighty 
percent of the nation’s central office switches and transmission equipment and 
nearly always purchased that equipment from AT&T’s Western Electric affili- 
ate, even when those products were more expensive or of lesser quality than 
equipment available from competing vendors.” lo3 The potential anticompeti- 
tive effect was twofold: consumers would pay higher prices and use telephones 
less, and new competition in the equipment business would be retarded. 
In unregulated areas, vertical integration has few price-output effects be- 
cause a lawful monopolist is legally free to charge the monopoly price for its 
product whether or not it purchased supplies from itself upstream.  ‘04  Without 
100. Antitrust Division Reappraisal of  1981,4  Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 13, 129 (1988). 
101. US. v. AT&T, 552 F.  Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff‘d sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 
102. United States v. AT&T, 524 F.  Supp. 1336 (D.D.C.  1981). 
103. United States v.  Western Electric Co., 900 F.  2d 283, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
104. See Antitrust Law,  710,725. 
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any need to justify an inflated downstream price, such a monopolist has every 
incentive to buy from the cheapest source. By contrast, a rate-regulated BOC 
has an economic incentive to pay an inflated price to AT&T and thereby earn 
excess profits for the supplying arm.  Since the regulators normally take a util- 
ity’s costs as given, the inflated equipment prices are passed on to consumers. 
In effect, consumers come to pay the monopoly price for telephone service 
“notwithstanding  the FCC’s best efforts to stop it.”lo5  Moreover, with few buy- 
ers other than self-supplying  AT&T, independent equipment makers had rela- 
tively little ability or incentive to enter or remain in the business or to engage 
in research or development looking toward better equipment or telephone ser- 
vice. The Justice Department’s theory of the case was that AT&T’s incentives 
and  ability to  prefer itself  and  thereby foreclose competition from  other 
sources themselves operated as an entry barrier. Potential equipment rivals be- 
lieved that they would not have open and competitive access to the patronage 
of the telephone monopolies and thus would not enter the market. 
What made the AT&T case far from simple was the Bell system’s claim that 
integration generated substantial efficiencies that would be lost if  the equip- 
ment business were separated from the local BOCs. Speaking generally, effi- 
ciencies appeared to result from network uniformityJM  and from joint engi- 
neering of the network and the products designed for kJo7  Centralizing these 
activities in Bell Labs allowed efficiencies that are not equally available when 
independent firms deal through the market.Io8 
Ironically, the close relationships that could create efficiencies could also 
lead to preferences for Western Electric and discrimination against indepen- 
dent equipment manufacturers. The latter repeatedly alleged that the Bell sys- 
tem maintained those close relationships to ensure that the BOCs would buy 
equipment from Western Electric at inflated prices and pass those on to con- 
105. Western Electric (n. 103 above) at 290. 
106. By  setting standards and engineering an integrated national telephone network, AT&T 
presumably assured that everything connected optimally with everything else, that an appropriate 
degree of  redundancy was built into the network to cope with natural calamities, and that this 
could all be done without incessant negotiations and frequent contractual revisions among inde- 
pendent parties. 
107. Through its basic and applied research, Bell Labs determined  the functions to be performed 
by  the telephone network and developed and disseminated generic specifications for new equip- 
ment needed to perform these functions. To  satisfy these generic requirements, Bell Labs (and 
occasionally others) then designed and developed specific products, which would be fabricated  by 
Western Electric. Bell Labs then evaluated the products that had been manufactured by Western 
Electric or others to decide which products best met the Bell system’s needs. 
108. For example, although network engineers worked in groups different from product design- 
ers, they could consult together at various preliminary stages. Before completing network specifi- 
cations, network engineers could solicit the cooperation  of product designers in assessing  the prac- 
tical feasibility at acceptable cost levels of various products and features. Because judgments on 
such matters could change as product design followed adoption and release of generic specifica- 
tions, the designers could return to the network engineers with suggested revisions in those speci- 
fications. Although unrelated firms could cooperate in the same way,  their partially adversarial 
relationship obstructs such cooperation. Each might fear that the other seeks selfish advantage 
rather than the good of “the whole”; indeed, there is no “whole” among unrelated firms. 595  Antitrust Policy 
sumers. This incentive for self-dealing meant that Bell Labs had an inherent 
conflict of interest that led it, according to critics, to choose its own designs 
and Western Electric products over better or cheaper designs or products of 
other manufacturers. Moreover, competing manufacturers saw themselves as 
victims of  an inherent or intentional informational disadvantage as well the 
victims of  price-cost manipulation. Product designers within the Bell system 
enjoyed superior access to essential network information.lo9  Furthermore, rival 
equipment manufacturers alleged that AT&T misallocated product design ex- 
penses (that should have been allocated to Western Electric products) to net- 
work engineering (and its associated research and development). By thus es- 
caping some of its true costs, Western Electric could appear to offer prices at 
or below rival prices, although its true costs and profits were no lower and 
perhaps even higher. 
The Justice  Department either doubted that  such  efficiencies existed or 
shared AT&T’s apparent view that any efficiencies of integration were destined 
to be lost anyway. Legislative and regulation proposals would have (1) imposed 
restrictions on the sharing of information between the Bell system’s telephone 
engineers and product designers, allowing them to communicate with each 
other only in much the same way as totally unrelated firms,11o  and (2)  required 
“competitive bidding” or market tests that would have prevented the Bell com- 
panies from buying Western Electric products even when they were the best or 
cheapest way to provide desired services.”’ Such “safeguards” seemed likely 
to deprive society of  the benefits of  integration without saving it the social 
109. Consultations by  network engineers before publicaGon of generic product specifications 
gave them a headstart. Later revision of  published specifications at the suggestion of affiliated 
product designers could make obsolete the work and expenditures  that independent manufacturers 
had based on the published generic specifications.  Thus, publication of network information was 
bound to seem to independents to be either too late (after Bell system designers’ headstart) or too 
early (before the generic specifications  became truly final and beyond subsequent alteration). 
110. See, e.g., Second Computer  Inquiry, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384,457-87 (1980) (requiring  that sepa- 
rate subsidiaries  be established to provide equipment on consumer premises that is connected to 
the network and prohibiting disclosure of  network information to subsidiaries before it is made 
public); Computer  and Business Equipment Manufacturers  Assn., 93 F.C.C. 2d 1226  (1983) (inter- 
preting Computer I1 rules to require disclosure of network information to manufacturers at make/ 
buy decision point, even when there is no communication  between subsidiaries);  H.R. 5158,97th 
Cong.,  1st Sess. $0 251-54  (1981) (requiring that  certain products  and  services be  provided 
through separate subsidiaries  and prohibiting disclosure of certain information to such subsidiaries 
unless it had been made public); proposed  amendment to S. 898, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981) 
(allowing results of  research and engineering studies to be made available to affiliates only if 
simultaneously  made public). Such proposals were also incorporated into the “regulatory”  decree 
that AT&T attempted to negotiate with the Justice Department. 
111. See, e.g., S. 898, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981) (“Baxter I” amendment containing market 
test dictating that Western Electric could have no greater market share of  Bell system business 
than it had of other business); H.R.  5158,97th  Cong., 1st Sess. $ 243 (requiring  “dominant  carrier” 
to purchase increasing percentages of products from unaffiliated manufacturers);  AT&T, Charges 
for Interstate Telephone Service (Docket 19129 Phase II),  64  EC.C. 2d 1,44-45 (1977) (requiring 
plan for separation  of procurement and manufacturing functions, including  procedures for compet- 
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costs of continued antitrust litigation, for antitrust immunity was not proposed, 
and someone would always claim that the “safeguards” had not worked. 
The basic rationale of the decree was very simple: the natural monopoly of 
local telephone service (where competition was not possible) was isolated 
from “adjacent markets” (where competition was fully possible but likely to 
be compromised if affiliated with the  The decree separated the 
regional monopolies into seven regional Bell operating companies and sepa- 
rated those BOCs from equipment manufacture and long-distance and certain 
other services.Il3 
Outside the regulated area, the government remained largely indifferent to 
vertical integration, although many private suits challenged an integrated firm’s 
refusal to  supply its competitors. The rulings are too various for coverage 
here,’14  although they illustrate the general theme of this paper that the courts 
have been reluctant to interfere with the individual firm’s internal efficiency- 
creating arrangements. 
9.5.2  Predatory Pricingri6 
Finding a rival’s price cut unwelcome, a firm may label it “predatory”  11’  and 
seek to enjoin it or to recover treble damages based on the profits that would 
have been earned at higher prices. Recent dispositions in the lower courts- 
without significant input from Congress, the administration, or the Supreme 
Court-illustrate  one path by which economic policy emerges from the legal 
system. 
Until a decade or so ago, courts left juries free to label prices as predatory 
on the basis of vague instructions inviting consideration of the defendant’s in- 
tention to capture the market, the “reasonableness” of the challenged price, the 
depth and duration of the cut, the impact on rivals, and similar factors. Obvi- 
ously, however, an intention to prevail and even to gain a monopoly is the 
essence of competition, not its antithesis, as the courts increasingly realized. 
Indeed, without a more disciplined test for predation, the risk of antitrust dam- 
11 2. The settlement also ended a previous consent decree preventing AT&T from competing in 
any noncommunication business, such as computers. 
113. In a few respects, the final decree did not completely isolate the operating monopoly from 
adjacent markets. For example, the BOCs were allowed to publish “yellow pages,”  in the hope 
that “excess profits” from the yellow pages would subsidize local telephone service and keep rates 
down. AT&T (n. 101 above) at 193-94. 
114. See Antitrust Law,  chap. 7D’. 
115. See ibid., ‘fls[ 729.2,736.2f. 
11  6. This nondetailed and nontechnical summary omits citations to the particular cases and 
commentaries, which are discussed at length in Anfitrust Law,  chaps. 7C, 7C‘. 
117. A monopolist violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act by  obtaining or maintaining its mo- 
nopoly through predatory pricing. Moreover, such pricing would normally be seen as an illegal 
attempt  to  monopolize  by  any firm with  a large  or dominant  market  share.  In  addition,  the 
Robinson-Patman Act’s  prohibition of price discriminations injuring the discriminator’s rivals is 
now largely understood to require predatory pricing. 597  Antitrust Policy 
ages or even litigation may  chill the impulse, perhaps already weak, toward 
price competition in oligopoly markets. 
A suggestion in the legal literature for a cost-based test of  predation ap- 
pealed to the courts and stimulated an outpouring of legal and economic com- 
mentary. There was general agreement that what maximizes consumer welfare 
in the short run does not necessarily do so in the long run, especially when 
dealing with strategic activity designed to benefit the predator, and harm the 
public, in the long run. Although the judges have not quite known how to 
choose among various proposals for dealing with the long run, this uncertainty 
has had remarkably little impact on the cases that now emphasize price-cost 
comparisons, approving prices above full costs with few qualms, approving 
prices above variable costs (as a rough surrogate for marginal costs), although 
with  more qualms, and  disapproving prices below  variable costs.118  Some 
courts make these price-cost comparisons determinative, seeing no readily ad- 
ministrable way  to deal with long-run strategic possibilities. Other courts re- 
fuse to make such comparisons determinative but usually end up approving 
prices above variable (or other) costs because nothing else clearly indicates 
long-run actual or intended harm. 
Second, the courts have become more sensitive to the prerequisites for suc- 
cessful predation-both  the ability to outlast rivals and the ability later to win 
enough monopoly profit long enough greatly to offset diminished revenues 
while destroying rivals. With many rivals, weakening one would not enable the 
alleged predator to earn monopoly profits. With easy entry, the prospective 
payoff  from ruining rivals would be  short lived at best. Hence, consumers 
would not be injured. With insufficient gains in prospect, moreover, the ratio- 
nal defendant would not sacrifice available short-run profits in the first place. 
Where successful predation is impossible, it probably has not occurred. 
Regarding predation as widespread, some criticize these developments as 
promonopoly rather than antitrust. Regarding successful predation as virtually 
impossible, others argue that any antipredation inquiry wastes resources at best 
and probably chills price competition as well. By contrast, it seems remarkable 
that mere judges have done as well as they have in this complex area. 
9.5.3  Monopolization Generally 
Monopolies are not unlawful unless acquired or maintained “willfully. ” The 
quoted term does not mean intentionally-for  building the better mousetrap 
that brings an intended monopoly is assuredly lawful-but  improperly. Unfor- 
tunately, the courts often let the jury decide what is improper. In the Aspen 
case, the defendant Ski Co. operated ski lifts on three mountains in the Aspen 
118. The present  account bypasses such obvious questions  as who measures variable costs, 
when, by what definition, and with what adjustment for circumstances affecting the closeness of 
variable to marginal costs. 598  Phillip Areeda 
area and was found (incorrectly) to have monopoly power. It had previously 
offered a discounted weekly four-mountain lift ticket with the other operator 
(Highlands) in the area but stopped doing so, apparently in the belief that its 
discounted, weekly, three-mountain ticket would outcompete a weekly one- 
mountain ticket from Highlands. The latter sued and prevailed after the jury 
was instructed that, although Ski had no unqualified duty to cooperate with 
Highlands, it was nevertheless liable if it acted “by anticompetitive or exclu- 
sionary means or for anticompetitive or exclusionary purposes.” 119 
Such a verbal formula is potentially mischievous, for a jury could see any 
conduct as “exclusionary” or “anticompetitive” as long as it is not obliged to 
say that a defendant must always market its product jointly with rivals. For 
example, Western Union (WU) supplied Telex service and decided to cease 
supplying the terminals on which messages were typed. It instructed its sales- 
people to try to sell its machines and to inform customers of machines made 
by others, including the plaintiff.LZo  Its commission schedule encouraged sales- 
men to peddle others’ terminals-to  the great benefit of the plaintiff, which 
had no salesmen of its own. Liquidating its own machines too slowly, Western 
Union altered its commission schedule to encourage salesman to push its own 
terminals, and plaintiffs’ sales fell. Plaintiff won a monopolization verdict on 
the ground that WU’s change in its practice of  aiding the plaintiff was moti- 
vated by  exclusionary purposes-a  desire later stated internally as one to 
“flush these turkeys.” The change was said to be unjustified by efficiency;  ped- 
dling plaintiff‘s machines as well as its own would maximize buyer choice. 
The appeals court wisely reversed. It reasoned that WU’s withdrawal from 
the machine market could hardly monopolize it, that punishing withdrawals of 
assistance to competitors would discourage such aid in the first place, and that 
rivals were presumably able to peddle their own machines. WU’s intention to 
“flush these turkeys” was irrelevant once the court decided that a firm is not 
obliged to promote rival products. After all, long-run efficiency is generally 
promoted by encouraging each firm to try its best to sell its own products. That 
was the national policy question at stake, and the court understood that it, not 
the jury, should make that policy choice.12L 
119. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,596 (1985). 
120. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v.  Western Union Telegr. Co., 797 F.  2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987). 
121. To similar effect was Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak, 603 F.  2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S.  1093 (1980),  in which Kodak was judged to be a monopolist. When Kodak 
introduced a new camera and distinctive film to accompany it, Berkey successfully claimed in the 
trial court that Kodak acted with exclusionary intent by  introducing the new products  without 
predisclosing them to Berkey. The appeals court correctly reversed, holding that requiring predis- 
closure was bad antitrust policy because it would reduce the return from and thus the incentive for 
innovation. Rather than leaving the jury to adopt the policy that innovators should share their 
discoveries with rivals in the guise of finding exclusionary intention, the court decided that pol- 
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9.6  Conclusion 
Antitrust law rests on general and vague legislation. Congress decided in 
1890 that competition should be promoted but did not decide how or to what 
extent, delegating  that task to the courts. Although it has occasionally amended 
the antitrust laws and retains the last word, antitrust policy is largely the prod- 
uct of the federal courts, supplemented in the merger area by the administra- 
tion’s choices as to which transactions to attack. Judicial policy-making differs 
from that of the other branches. Courts rule only episodically in the peculiar 
procedural context of the specific facts, issues, and arguments that happen to 
be presented to them by the government as plaintiff or by private parties pro- 
moting their own interests. Moreover, judges are further constrained by their 
own competence as lawyers rather than as economists  framing industrial  policy 
and by legal methods that submerge policy choices in procedural rulings and 
language emphasizing legal doctrine and appealing to precedent and “estab- 
lished law.” 
Yet policy choices do emerge from this stew of precedent, legal technicalit- 
ies, procedural rulings, different degrees of economic sophistication,  accidents 
of  opinion writing, and occasionally clearly understood policy. It may seem 
remarkable that sensible policy appears so often. It would appear more often if 
the judges focused more consciously on the truth that many procedural rulings 
allowing a jury to impose liability on certain conduct amount to a policy 
against such conduct, and vice versa. Getting more of the policy choices out 
in the open would improve the process. 
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2.  William F. Baxter 
In thinking about antitrust policy during the first Reagan administration, or any 
other period of time, it is important to recognize the inherent limitations that 
the Justice Department faces in establishing policy. I do not refer to the fact 
that policy is largely determined by statutes passed by Congress and by their 
interpretation in federal courts, although that circumstance is of  course a sig- 
nificant constraint. Nevertheless, the statutes and their interpretation are often 
very vague, and ample room is left in which to move. Rather, I refer to the fact 
that the Antitrust Division can only bring cases and hence is only well suited 
to achieving changes in the direction of  more, rather than less, government 
intervention in the marketplace. For a variety of institutional reasons, it is quite 
inconceivable to bring cases for the purpose of  losing them. 
I had thought a fair amount about these factors and the sense in which they 
establish a one-way ratchet that, in my opinion, has contributed substantially 
over the years to a pattern of  meddlesome, interventionist antitrust policy, 
sometimes petty and mechanical as in the tie-in area, sometimes discretionary 
and potentially disastrous as in the concept of no-fault monopoly that charac- 
terized the old Alcoa decision and underlay the attack on IBM. 
Recognizing those constraints, I was less than wildly enthusiastic when I 
was called by Ed Schmults [then deputy attorney general designate] in January 
of 198  1 and asked whether I would come to Washington to discuss the possibil- 
ity of becoming the next Antitrust chief. 
I called back after several days, soon thereafter went East to talk with Ed and 
with William French Smith [then attorney general designate], and was quite 
forthright about my concerns and about my  intentions. After describing the 
one-way ratchet problem, I indicated that I planned to counteract that pressure 
by being aggressively noisy and confrontationally critical of existing antitrust 
doctrine in every forum that I could get to, particularly including the congres- 
sional committees, thereby attempting to build a backfire against an ever more 
interventionist antitrust policy by giving the business community a glimpse of 
a future far less encumbered by pointless rules and roulettes. I told Schmults 
and Smith, neither of  whom I had ever talked to before, that my immediate 
objectives would include the following: expeditious disposition one way or the 
other of  both the AT&T case and the IBM case; promulgating new merger 
guidelines; improving the general understanding in the business community of 601  Antitrust Policy 
the importance of  intellectual property, trade secrets, and patents and copy- 
rights; and increasing the alienability, and hence the value, of such property by 
getting rid of  a variety of the absurd antitrust restrictions having to do with 
licensing and with ownership transfers. Finally, I indicated that I would devote 
substantial resources to developing an amicus program in which the Justice 
Department would file supporting briefs on the side of antitrust defendants in 
private antitrust litigation and attempt to persuade the courts, when we per- 
ceived it to be the case, that the rules being advocated by the plaintiff were in 
fact destructive of rather than supportive of competition. This last program, I 
predicted during that first interview, would be highly controversial. I empha- 
sized that I had no interest in coming to Washington to be an assistant attorney 
general in the tradition of my predecessors. I asked them to find someone else 
unless they felt they would be comfortable with the execution of the agenda I 
had suggested. And I told them that I would stay as long but no longer than 
the moment that further progress on that agenda was possible. 
Only a few days passed after my return from Washington to Stanford before 
Bill Smith called and asked me to come on. I moved quickly and was sitting 
in the office by late January, although I did not complete the relocation of my 
shell-shocked family until late March and was not officially confirmed until 
early April. 
I will deal with the AT&T case first because it was the very first item to 
which I turned. Some of  you  will recall that a tentative consent decree had 
been negotiated between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and AT&T late in 
1980. I will refer to it as the “December decree.” Judge Green had declined to 
accept it, in view of the then-impending change in administration, unless the 
new administration expressed satisfaction with it. I studied that proposed con- 
sent decree in my first weeks at the Justice Department. I rejected it. 
I have not gone back, proximate to the time of this presentation, to review 
the terms of the December decree. I remember that my reaction to it then was 
that it was more nearly punitive and symbolic than sensibly addressed to the 
underlying structural problem of the telecommunications industry. The decree 
would have divested some but not all of  Western Electric from AT&T. It re- 
quired the divestiture of a few, but only a few, of the Bell operating companies 
(BOCs). But it failed to take the one step that I regarded as structurally crucial, 
namely, to separate the inescapably regulated local exchange activity, a natural 
monopoly resting on the pervasive scale economies present in the local loops, 
from every other species of  activity save only those activities functionally 
proximate to the local loops that had to be included in the basic operating 
companies to achieve efficient operation. Assuming that there had been a vio- 
lation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, it was clear to me that a sensible rem- 
edy called for divestiture of the local exchange portion of the network, with 
the cut being made above the level of  a class 5 switch and no higher in the 
switching hierarchy than the class 4  switch. But I wanted to review the evi- 
dence on the merits with respect to the question of substantive violation before 602  William F.  Baxter 
making any response if I could. Judge Green had insisted that he have an an- 
swer to the acceptability of the December consent decree by the end of March 
and that litigation was to resume the first week in April unless he had an affir- 
mative answer. My request for additional time was denied. I then communi- 
cated a negative answer regarding the decree, and we went back to trial. 
I reviewed the evidence bearing on the merits as quickly as I could, although 
more and more distractions were consuming my time. In particular, intracabi- 
net warfare was being waged by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and 
Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige against my stated intention to go 
forward with the trial in the AT&T case. I will never be certain whether I was 
helped or hurt by the fact, but both the assistant attorney general and the deputy 
attorney general had found it necessary to recuse themselves in the AT&T case 
and thus were completely out of  the loop in the running battle between me, 
Weinberger, and Baldrige, a battle that continued through the summer and au- 
tumn of 198  1. Basically, they wanted me to drop or delay the case, ostensibly 
so that the Congress could “work its will.” My position was that there was no 
reasonable prospect that the Congress was ever going to get together on any 
legislation, that the judge would not permit delay, and that, if  I were to drop 
the case, it would cause a political stink that would damage the credibility of 
the administration at its outset. I concurred in the proposition that the call was 
properly one for the White House and told them that I was quite willing to 
drop the case if they would simply persuade the president of the rightness of 
their views and have him instruct me in writing to dismiss the case. No such 
written instruction ever arrived. They wanted me to take the political heat for 
their policy call, and I made it clear that I was not going to do that. This fencing 
went on through the summer of  1981. In response to pressure from those two 
departments, and in an effort to strike a cooperative posture toward the Con- 
gress,  I  submitted two  proposed  amendments to  the  pending  legislation, 
amendments that because known in Washington as “Baxter One” and “Baxter 
Two.” That performance, I confess, was rather disingenuous: I had absolutely 
no expectation that the Congress would ever find either of the two amendments 
acceptable. And I intended the amendments more as a tutorial on what the 
AT&T problem really was than as serious legislative proposals. 
As early as April 1981, I had told AT&T, in response to an inquiry from its 
general counsel, Howard Trienens, what I would regard as a satisfactory con- 
sent decree on the basis of which I would be willing to settle and dismiss the 
case. I told them that my terms were the surgical separation of the local ex- 
change activity as described in the preceding paragraph. He smiled and con- 
fessed that he would not even bother carrying that answer back to his client 
because his client would find it totally unacceptable. I smiled and told him that 
my proposal had one enormous advantage to AT&T I proposed to let AT&T 
work out all business and financial aspects of its own reorganization subject to 
the basic architectural constraints that I had enumerated. I said that I thought 
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reorganization as he surely would when the government won the case, as I 
expected we would. 
In September, Judge Green ruled on a motion to dismiss at the end of the 
government’s case, and his opinion made it clear that, in his view, the govern- 
ment was winning the factual battle hands down. AT&T and the government 
prepared to resume litigation in January 1982, hearing AT&T’s evidence. As 
those preparations went on, my proposed consent decree apparently began to 
look better to AT&T, and, in December, Howard phoned to ask whether we 
might talk about it once more. We  started drafting a decree. Negotiations con- 
tinued furiously for several weeks over the question of the precise point in the 
network hierarchy where the cut between local and long distance would be 
made. AT&T wanted to make the cut immediately above the class 5 switch. 
That would dictate that rival long-distance carriers interface with the local ex- 
change carriers at tens of  thousands of  nodes all over the United States. I 
wanted a greater concentration  of traffic to occur while it remained in the hands 
of the local exchange carriers (LECs) and wanted the cut to occur closer to the 
class 4  switch. We  eventually arrived at a compromise that neither of  us 
thought very satisfactory. The agreement was announced on 8 January 1982. 
Before dropping the topic of AT&T, I would like to explain that there are 
two distinct forms of misbehavior in which the predivestiture AT&T had the 
capacity and the incentive to engage and, in my view, had in fact engaged. One 
of the two operates through self-dealing. It is the pattern of cross-subsidization 
that Phillip Areeda outlines nicely in his background paper. In the context of 
central office switches, prototypically, AT&T charges the regulated local ex- 
change carrier too much for the switch, raises local telephone rates to cover 
those costs, and banks the profit outside the scope of  state regulation at the 
switch manufacturing level of Western Electric. If the local regulator is suffi- 
ciently obtuse, the effectiveness of regulation is totally subverted as the inte- 
grated company syphons all consumer surplus out from under the demand 
curve for local telephone service. If the local regulator is somewhat more as- 
tute, it insists on regulating the rate of return for Western Electric as well as 
for the local exchange carrier. Many states had taken this course. The result is 
to extend the span of incentive deadening regulation to a much greater slice of 
GNP than is dictated by the natural monopoly circumstance that gives rise to 
the need for regulation. 
The second form of misbehavior is rather more subtle and causes the dollars 
to flow in the opposite direction. For example, it might occur when there is a 
substantial demand for a technologically  new application: for example, the air- 
lines need a real-time, on-line, semiprivate network connecting airline offices 
and travel agencies all over the United States to operate a reservation system 
that is capable of yielding instant information on a seat-by-seat  basis as to what 
is vacant and what is sold. For the long-distance segments of  this proposed 
network, the airlines might be able to go to several competing carriers. But, in 
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the network must terminate through the local exchange in every city in the 
United States. If  the local exchange will not interface with any long-distance 
carrier except an affiliated carrier, justifying its refusal with a complicated 
story about interface intricacies and economies of  vertical integration, then 
the integrated enterprise is able to construct entry barriers at the potentially 
competitive long-distance level, and it is able to charge monopoly prices for 
the service to the airlines, thereby causing the airline ticket prices to be too 
high. The monopoly profits are now flowed to the local exchange entities, 
where they serve to subsidize residential phone rates. Since most members of 
the local Public Utilities Commission will in fact be running for attorney gen- 
eral if not governor of their states, this is a very popular maneuver. Unlike the 
first mode of misbehavior, to which the local Public Utilities Commission will 
be hostile although not necessarily effectively so, this second form of misbe- 
havior will reliably enlist the local PUC as an ally. Although, in my judgment, 
both forms of  misbehavior were being carried on by  AT&T,  in quantitative 
terms the second was vastly more significant and involved billions of  dollars 
of  misallocation. A very  substantial part of  local exchange costs was being 
born by  potential competitive, but entry blocked areas of  activity, primarily 
long-distance services. 
One could, of  course, regard this as a matter of  common costs to which 
Ramsey pricing would be an appropriate reaction. But the patterns of pricing 
that were observable were nowhere near Ramsey. Quite the contrary, the least 
elastic demands were present at the local loop level. 
The AT&T case consumed perhaps 35 percent of my time during the year 
1981. The IBM case consumed another 35 percent. As soon as I had deter- 
mined that 1 was unwilling to accept the December decree in AT&T and that 
the factual evidence made the case substantively sound, I sent the AT&T litiga- 
tors off to battle and turned to a substantive review of the IBM case. I found 
the records and the documents that had been assembled totally intimidating. 
There was no reasonable prospect that I could get through any substantial frac- 
tion of that material, however long I remained in Washington. A few meetings 
with the government litigation team revealed that it was infused with inappro- 
priate zeal and exhibited total insensitivity to the problem of antitrust inhibi- 
tion of vigorous competition. It could not be relied on for objective evaluation. 
I decided to approach substantive evaluation by scheduling a series of seminars 
on particular issues. Friday afternoons were set aside for the purpose, or per- 
haps it was every second Friday afternoon. The government litigation team and 
the IBM litigation team (Cravath, Swaine & Moore) each were to submit, by 
the immediately preceding Wednesday, a memorandum containing references 
to documents and to the trial record regarding some major fact issue: for ex- 
ample, what was the relevant market, what was IBM’s share, did IBM misbe- 
have  in the pricing of  the 360-90  machine, did IBM misbehave in modify- 
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quence was  greatly to  complicate the interface problems of  a competitive 
disc drive, etc. 
I am no longer able to recall and to report the precise factual conclusions 
that I reached on these various issues. My basic conclusion was that the govern- 
ment was right on only a few of them and that a few was not enough. The 
government was probably correct that the relevant market during the complaint 
period  was  something  like  “large  size,  general  business  purpose,  data- 
processing machines,” although one did not have to look very far forward to 
see the contours of that market being effectively assailed. And surely IBM did 
have, and had had for a long time, a very large fraction of that market. But 
unless Section 2 was to be regarded as creating a status offense, there was no 
violation unless significant instances of socially undesirable behavior could be 
proved. And instances of such misbehavior by IBM were not supported by the 
trial record. I take as an example one fact episode that was regarded by the 
government as one of its most damning: predatory pricing of the 360-90  ma- 
chine. Yes, IBM had lost money on the 360-90  machine, but it did not follow, 
as the government seemed to think it did, that IBM pricing of  that machine 
was predatory. The 360-90  was by  conscious design a highly experimental 
machine through which IBM hoped to enter the supercomputer market. Its 
costs were in  major part research and development costs, with  substantial 
transferability to other existing machines and to machines unbuilt. Most im- 
portant, IBM never succeeded in selling more than a handful of the machines, 
even at the low prices to which government objection was taken. Meanwhile, 
the supposed victims of the predatory scheme were successfully selling ma- 
chines in vastly greater numbers. As an example of predation, it was pathetic. 
When the series of  seminars had come to an end and I had reviewed my 
notes, it was quite clear to me that the case was substantially at its end and 
should be dismissed. The only litigation step that remained was to submit pro- 
posed findings of fact to the judge. One approach that I might have taken was 
to let the case run its course in the hopes that the judge would reach the same 
conclusion I had, namely, that the case should be dismissed because the gov- 
ernment had not proved what it had to prove. 
Had I thought that outcome a reasonable prospect, I probably would have 
followed that path. As chief of the government effort, I could have accepted 
the outcome gracefully and given an endless series of  speeches on why the 
judge was really right and why good competition policy required the govern- 
ment to prove far more than it had proved. 
But I was dreadfully confident that that was  not to be the outcome. The 
record revealed with unmistakable clarity that the judge, already well past re- 
tirement age, planned to run out his career managing the IBM case; further- 
more, he had developed an intense and often quite undisguised hatred for at 
least one member of the IBM trial team. The problem was not that the govern- 
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level, a result that would be followed by  an appeal by  IBM to the Second 
Circuit, an appeal I thought almost certainly successful.  Then, in 1984 or 1985, 
the parties would find themselves back in the federal district court, before the 
same judge, if he was then still alive, dealing with a remand order from the 
Second Circuit, at which point the record in the case would be absolutely irrel- 
evant to the current status of the data-processing  industry. I dismissed it myself 
on 8 January 1982. 
I am painfully conscious of the frequency with which I have been using the 
first-person singular. That usage is verbally economical but quite unjustified. I 
had three magnificent assistants whom I had brought to the Antitrust Division 
with me, two of whom had been my own students, a third the student of one 
of my closest friends, a professor at the University of Chicago, who had recom- 
mended each of  us to the other. Tad  Lipsky, a Stanford Ph.D. candidate in 
economics and a law school graduate who had been my teaching assistant and 
on whose dissertation committee I had served, was with me and helped me at 
each step of the way through the entire IBM matter. Ron Can, a graduate of 
the Chicago Law School and one of the most intelligent and sensible lawyers 
with whom I have ever worked, was largely responsible for the result in the 
AT&T case and took the laboring oar in overseeing the corporate reorganiza- 
tion. Tyler Baker, another of my research assistants at Stanford, was the prin- 
cipal draftsman of the Merger Guidelines, to which I will eventually come. 
A third matter to which I gave some attention in the early months of  1981 
was the problem posed by antitrust subversion of the value of intellectual prop- 
erty. One of the most intellectually arid, judicially irresponsible, and, in my 
view, quantitatively significant of antitrust errors has been its treatment of the 
competitiodintellectual property interface. Intellectual  property, and the legis- 
lative decision to confer exclusivity on owners of intellectual property, repre- 
sents a judgment where the long-run dynamic gains from rewarding its cre- 
ation exceed the short-run static losses that are associated with the time-limited 
phenomenon of exclusivity. That there is a trade-off between these long-run 
and short-run phenomena is sufficiently obvious that one would suppose the 
courts would not have regarded as cosmic perception their own discovery of a 
tension between antitrust and the short-run dynamic characteristics of intellec- 
tual property; but they did, and they deduced from their perception the conclu- 
sion that intellectual property must be narrowly confined. Especially in the 
hands of the Warren Court and Justices Black and Douglas in particular, nar- 
row confinement often meant total emasculation. And one particular line of 
emasculation involved the elimination of practicable licensing possibilities. 
Intellectual property, like any other information, is inherently intangible. 
Once the information is developed and comprehended,  an incremental applica- 
tion of the information in one more useful context to produce one more unit of 
output has a marginal cost approaching zero, and, typically, it is not an observ- 
able event. For these reasons, the problem of drafting royalty clauses in intel- 
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reasonable proportion of the surplus under the demand curve for his property, 
he must be able to charge more to those who use the idea in applications  having 
lofty derived demand curves and less in applications where the derived demand 
curves are more modest. And, in any particular application, appropriation is 
significantly enhanced if  the owner is able to charge more to those who use 
the idea more intensely and achieve with it greater value added than he charges 
to those who use it less intensively and achieve less. 
These objectives require metering devices of one kind or another. If the in- 
vention is a new  machine, royalties based on the revolutions the machine 
makes each month may be an entirely satisfactory  device. Of course, it requires 
a tamper-proof revolution counter and a monthly visit by the meter reader and 
thus is an expensive counting device. The social costs of  metering may  be 
greatly reduced if the patentee can require that the user of a patented stapling 
machine buy all his staples from the patentee (or the patentee’s nominee). Stan- 
dard judicial doctrine looks at such an instance and leaps to the absurd conclu- 
sion that the patentee is attempting to monopolize staples. It  matters not 
whether the number of staples demanded for use in conjunction with the ma- 
chine is orders of magnitude smaller than the total number of staples produced 
and sold in the relative market. 
There are a variety of contexts, particularly involving process patents and 
combination patents, in which identification of a satisfactory counting device 
is, at best, challenging. By holding that the licensor of  a process patent “is 
attempting to extend the patent beyond the legal boundaries of his monopoly,” 
the courts have held that he may not base his royalty on the output of the pro- 
cess because, it is said, the output is not subject to the exclusivity feature pa- 
tent. It is quite sensible for the courts to be alert to reject any effort by a paten- 
tee to extend the scope of exclusivity to products or activities not covered by 
the claims of  the patent. But no  such extension of  claims of  exclusivity are 
involved in the cases to which I refer; rather, there is a confusion between the 
problem of extending claims of exclusivity and the problem of basing the roy- 
alty on  a product or activity admittedly not within the realm of exclusivity. 
There can be no conceivable objection to using, as a royalty counting device, 
some palpable object or operation that is a strong complement to the exclu- 
sively held abstract idea. 
It is sometimes said with a straight face that we should insist that the paten- 
tee base his royalty obligation as narrowly as possible on the patented idea 
because this will facilitate substitution in the production process of other re- 
sources for incremental uses of the exclusively held idea and thus increase the 
elasticity of demand for the idea itself. It is not clear why anyone would advo- 
cate substituting resources with positive marginal social costs for resources 
without marginal social costs or why, in the face of legislative creation of  an 
intellectual property system, it is thought to be a good idea to minimize the 
returns to creativity. 
In the 1970s, the Justice Department had industriously gathered up nine 
’ 608  William F. Baxter 
instances of these enfeebling inanities and bundled them into a policy state- 
ment that became known in the industry as the “nine no-nos.’’ The DOJ an- 
nounced that it would proudly bring antitrust actions against intellectual prop- 
erty  licenses  that  contained  one  or  more  of  these  nine  perfectly  benign 
practices; DOJ declared that each of  the practices was illegal per se. In the 
spring of 1981, we issued a policy statement repudiating the “nine no-nos” and 
attempted to explain why such devices were frequently useful and efficient 
devices for minimizing transaction costs and maximizing returns to creativity, 
usually without any increase in the static deadweight loss associated with the 
claim to exclusivity. 
But it was not clear then, and it is not clear now, how much good the repudia- 
tion did. It is one thing to promise that the Justice Department will not proceed 
against licenses that have those characteristics; it is quite another to be able to 
give assurances that private parties will not do so. Although I think that the 
analysis is now understood by most attorneys who practice in intellectual prop- 
erty areas, many of them, probably most of them, still abide by the “nine no- 
nos”  for  entirely  sensible  reasons.  Some  thirteenth-best  royalty-counting 
device is available, and its use carries assurance that corporate counsel (sub- 
stantially all patent licenses are drafted by in-house counsel) will not be embar- 
rassed by a subsequent judicial decision holding that his license constitutes an 
antitrust violation or, at best, a “misuse” of the intellectual property. The im- 
pact of the inferior revenue mechanism on returns may be substantial, but at 
least it is a great deal less obvious. And, of course, if returns are too greatly 
diminished, there is always the alternative of abandoning the practice of licens- 
ing entirely. 
This problem is an extreme instance of  the one-way-ratchet limit on in- 
fluence. 
Yet  another undertaking on which we  started in the months immediately 
after our arrival at the Justice Department was the drafting of  the Merger 
Guidelines. I viewed this task as one of  exceptional importance. But I also 
knew that, because of the other problems then on my desk, I probably would 
not turn to it for a year or more. Accordingly, I decided to appoint a committee 
chaired by Tyler Baker to create an initial draft and to solicit comment on it. I 
told Tyler that the draft was to spell out the process of market definition, to 
use a measure of  concentration that had a richer content than the four-firm 
concentration ratio, to deal with the problem of  entry, and to deal with the 
problem of efficiencies. In my view, the document produced by Tyler and his 
colleagues represents the most important contribution to the general welfare 
by the Antitrust Division in recent history. 
Prior to the Celler-Kefauver Amendments of  1950, there was no merger 
control law in the United States. Mergers could be reached, it is true, under 
Section 1 of  the Sherman Act as “agreements in restraint of  trade,” but the 
courts used that power with great restraint during the first half century of the 
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ton Act was intended by the Congress to be a merger control law, but it was 
not; it was intended, for reasons that are obscure, to limit the use of the holding 
company structure. (I take particular note of this fact because the error, which 
is widespread, has crept into the background paper prepared by Areeda, al- 
though I know from his other writings that he does not disagree with the judg- 
ment that I have expressed in the text.) It is entirely clear that the Congress, in 
passing the 1950 amendments to Section 7, was articulating a policy prefer- 
ence that  a merger control regime both more restrictive and more encom- 
passing in its scope of inquiry be executed by the enforcement agencies and 
by the courts. 
Congress got what it asked for, in spades. The Antitrust Division brought a 
sequence of absurd cases starting with the Brown Shoe decision, where a verti- 
cal acquisition by  a 4 percent manufacturer of  a  lY2 percent distributor was 
held unlawful notwithstanding that the market at each functional level was 
wholly without concentration. The Supreme Court opinion left the lower courts 
without effective guidance as to relevant criteria. 
The Philadelphia Bank case halted a merger that probably should have been 
stopped, and the opinion articulated a somewhat more reasonable standard, 
suggesting that a merger between two firms whose market shares in any rele- 
vant market summed to 30 percent was presumptively illegal. But, although 
we learned that a sum of 30 percent was too much, there was no suggestion of 
what was not too much, and Brown Shoe was cited with approval. The Phila- 
delphia Bank case was shortly followed by a series of intellectually dishonest 
opinions that manipulated market definition so as to produce market shares 
that summed to 30 percent, and they,  in turn, were followed finally by  the 
Von’s Grocery case, involving the merger of two 4 percent grocery chains. That 
merger was held illegal because the market was exhibiting a “trend toward 
concentration,” the number of firms having fallen over a period of eleven years 
from 5,365 to 3,818. 
These developments occurred in the twenty-five years immediately subse- 
quent to the Second World War. The US.  economy was unchallenged by rivals. 
Western Europe and Japan were rebuilding from wartime devastation. Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union faced not only the rebuilding problem but also 
the overwhelming handicap of command-and-control modes of economic or- 
ganization. If this line of merger cases was imposing substantial inefficiency 
on the U.S. economy, and I believe that it was and continued to do so well into 
the 1980s, there was not, at the date of the cases I have mentioned, any standard 
that would furnish objective support for that proposition. At least in retrospect 
it seems clear that we were saddled with an absurdly restrictive merger policy, 
toward horizontal mergers in particular but toward vertical mergers to a lesser 
degree, from the mid- 1960s onward. 
During those same years, the corporate community became convinced that 
management was a science transcending the industrial characteristic of  that 
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violin company. No doubt a variety of nonlegal forces contributed to this mind- 
set: the rapidly increasing utility of the computer, given the development of  a 
general operating system that allowed applications programs to be written in 
higher-level languages; the enormous increase in the efficiency of communica- 
tions and the availability of  semiprivate networks; and perhaps the infusion 
into corporate ranks of  tens of  thousands of  M.B.A.s who had never seen a 
factory floor. 
The excessively restrictive merger laws combined with the previously men- 
tioned  forces  to  produce  an  enormous  wave  of  conglomeration  in  the 
U.S. economy. It became clear eventually that management skills were not as 
ubiquitously  transferable as had  been  supposed. The conglomerates, as a 
group, did rather badly. As international competition from Western Europe and 
Japan intensified, this conclusion became ever more dramatically evident in 
corporate financial reports. We  are still emerging from the conglomeration 
wave, and deconglomeration implies respecialization and hence horizontal 
mergers. My immediate purpose in writing the Merger Guidelines was to facil- 
itate the movement in the direction of deconglomeration. I had no particular 
preconception as to how loose merger standards should be beyond a tutored 
intuition that one generally need not worry about structure in a market that had 
eight or ten or more firms of roughly comparable size. 
The Merger Guidelines have been criticized for being too permissive and 
for being too restrictive. I fully expected the first line of criticism. The Guide- 
lines were substantially more permissive than the body of case law that I was 
attempting to alter. They were more permissive not primarily in the size of the 
market shares that were permitted to combine: a change in the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index (HHI) of 100 points corresponds to a merger between two 7 
percent firms, and 7 percent is only 175 percent as large as the “two 4 percent 
firms” standard that appeared in the 1968 Justice Department Guidelines. The 
sense in which the new  Guidelines were dramatically more permissive lay 
rather in the level of market concentration prerequisite to viewing a merger as 
a problem at all. The prerequisite of a relatively highly concentrated industry 
was a point that the Brown Shoe line of cases had missed almost entirely. An- 
ticipating that the criticism would come from that side of  the spectrum, the 
safe-harbor threshold of  1,000 points on the HHI was selected as much as a 
political anchorage to windward as because anyone thought that nicely round 
number was just right. I will comment on criticism from the opposite side, 
mostly unanticipated, hereafter. 
For me, the two most difficult problems posed by  the Merger Guidelines 
were the provisions dealing with recognition of efficiencies  and with the failing 
firm problem. The efficiencies problem was primarily an empirical one. I was 
convinced that a little bit of efficiency outweighs a whole lot of market power. 
But, if  the Department took the position that an expectation of cost savings 
could offset an expectation that market power was being created-note  that 
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would be promised in every individual case. I expected the Justice Depart- 
ment’s error rate in evaluating those claims to be very high. Selecting the sub- 
stantive rule that will result in minimizing the sum of type one and type two 
errors in a context such as this one is very difficult. My own judgment as to 
how that might best be done was to adopt a permissive merger standard so that 
one worried about the generation of market power only when concentration 
was substantial and market shares were large, thus permitting efficiencies to 
be attained without ever addressing their presence or magnitude and, having 
done that, to deny recognition of claims of efficiency in the remaining cases 
except when the claim was of substantial magnitude and, atypically, could be 
shown clearly and convincingly. Hence, the initial version of  the efficiency 
provision was, on its face, relatively hostile to such claims. The efficiencies 
provision is one of several in the 1982 Guidelines that was substantially  rewrit- 
ten in the 1984 Guidelines, but it seems doubtful to me that the substantive 
change is as great as the verbal change. 
A failing firm defense is necessary because it is obvious that it is never 
desirable, as a matter of economic policy, to cause productive assets to be con- 
signed to the scrap heap or to be moved to new areas of activity where their 
value is significantly less than the value in their initial activity. If a firm is truly 
failing in the sense that it is about to abandon a field of activity, then, provided 
that the assets will be used for some level of production in the hands of new 
owners, it is better that they be acquired and used even if their acquirors, post- 
merger, have a 100 percent market share. Prices cannot be higher or output 
lower in the market if, instead, the assets are removed from production entirely. 
The more difficult problem arises not when there is one potential buyer but 
when there are several, who offer a range of prices. One must then entertain 
the hypothesis that the high bidder sees incremental value in the assets not 
because of  their productive potential but because, secure from the hands of 
others who might use them intensively, the assets create market power. What 
substantive rules can channel assets, under those circumstances,  into the hands 
of the bidder who would use them to produce the largest output? 
The obvious difficulty of that factual question and the institutional unsuit- 
ability of the Antitrust Division to provide the answer have deterred any serious 
suggestion that the problem be approached directly. Rather, the law has at- 
tempted to cope with the problem by asking whether, with respect to any par- 
ticular bidder for such assets, there is some other “less competitively offen- 
sive”  potential  buyer;  and,  to  advance  that  inquiry,  it  has  imposed  the 
procedural requirement that the seller attempt to shop the assets to competi- 
tively less offensive buyers. 
But one cannot seriously suppose that these issues would be satisfactorily 
resolved by  requiring that assets be transferred to that bidder who has the 
smallest market share so long as his bid exceeds scrap value by a dollar. If the 
industry is sufficiently concentrated to pose a merger problem, and if market 
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does not  seem tenable to insist that the seller accept the lowest bid on  the 
basis of the presumption that all higher bids reflect not productivity but market 
power aspirations. 
The problem is further compounded by  the great difficulty in  knowing 
whether the seller has really shopped the assets to “less competitively  offensive 
buyers” in good faith. If the seller has an offer he regards as satisfactory from 
one company, he has a strong incentive to assure that no lower bid be forthcom- 
ing from any other. The seller’s investment banker perceives his client’s objec- 
tive without receiving detailed instructions, and, when the assets are placed 
with him for sale, it would be an incompetent investment banker indeed who 
could not go through the motions of contacting potential buyers without suc- 
cess. The value to the investment banker of  the patronage of  the seller will 
almost invariably exceed any “success premium” that the Justice Department 
insists be made a part of the investment banker’s reward structure. If the Justice 
Department attempts vertical integration into investment banking, it is not 
likely to be a successful peddler: he who receives a cold call from the Justice 
Department has every reason to expect that he is being asked to buy a role in 
a lawsuit as well as a bundle of assets. 
No Guideline change was in the 1984 version, but I do not believe that that 
fact reflects satisfaction with the current resolution of the problem. 
The only other policy initiative that seems to me to deserve mention is one 
particular offshoot of the amicus program. We  did indeed intrude ourselves 
into a number of private lawsuits, and we filed briefs in opposition to one party 
or the other who was asserting a position that we regarded as seriously wrong 
but nevertheless had some prospect of  succeeding, either because it was sup- 
ported by  precedent or because it had enough superficial plausibility to be- 
dazzle the district judge involved. One particular theme in that general cam- 
paign of law purification was an effort to harmonize the rules with respect to 
resale price maintenance, or vertical price fixing, with the rest of the law of 
vertical arrangements. 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in the Sylvania case, substantially all 
vertical arrangements,  but not resale price maintenance,  were held to be subject 
to a rule of reason. That, as a practical matter, meant that they were OK unless 
someone was able to show that, because of  the market context, the vertical 
arrangement had the potential for aggravating a horizontal problem in a con- 
centrated market. That rarely was the case. 
But, as to resale price maintenance, the situation was more complex. The 
Supreme Court had held, back in  1911, that vertical price arrangements had 
precisely the same consequences and  were objectionable for precisely  the 
same reasons as horizontal price fixing. Hence, they were subject to the same 
per se  restrictions. And the courts have repeated this nonsense over the in- 
tervening years. 
During the Depression, Congress legalized resale price maintenance (RPM) 
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mid-1970s. In  1975, Congress repealed that conditional legalization, and re- 
sale price maintenance was understood by all to be restored to the state of the 
law reflected in the old Dr. Miles case. It was illegal per se. 
But, until Sylvania, vertical market divisions and vertical customer alloca- 
tions were also illegal per se;  and no one seriously doubted that the court had 
the power to move them into the rule of reason category pursuant to its gener- 
ally recognized authority to invent and refurbish competition law within the 
gaping interstices of existing legislation. 
Was the power of courts to reinterpret the law as it pertained to vertical price 
fixing any less? Yes, some argued, it was less. In 1975, Congress eliminated 
the conditional legalization and quite clearly intended to put the practice back 
into per  se illegality from whence it had come. Yes, all conceded that. But that 
didn’t really answer the question. Nothing in the 1975 legislation indicated that 
Congress intended both to put RPM back in the per se  illegal category and 
to freeze its status, removing this particular feature of antitrust law from the 
interpretive freedom of the courts. For some reason, the distinction between 
returning resale price maintenance to aper  se status over which courts retained 
discretionary interpretive freedom and freezing it in a category with respect to 
which there was no interpretive freedom was a distinction that proved difficult 
to explain to a large number of politicians. 
Spray-Rite v. Monsanto was one of the private cases into which we intruded. 
Monsanto manufactured an agricultural herbicide that had to be applied just 
so in order to work properly, and it had placed a great deal of emphasis in its 
own marketing efforts on equipping its dealers to give tutorials to the ultimate 
farmer users. Monsanto also clearly discouraged price competition among its 
dealers, perhaps in an effort to force them to compete along a more service- 
oriented parameter of  rivalry. In any event, it refused to renew Spray-Rite’s 
dealership after competitive dealers had complained of Spray-Rite’s price cut- 
ting. The court of appeals affirmed a poorly supported jury finding that the 
refusal to renew was pursuant to a conspiracy with the reporting dealers to set 
resale prices. In doing so, it announced a new evidentiary rule: if  there are 
complaints by competitive dealers about the plaintiff dealer’s price cutting, and 
if, subsequent to such complaints, the manufacturer terminates the dealer, that 
constitutes sufficient evidence of a vertical price fixing agreement. Unhappy 
with this post hoc ergo propter hoc approach to the problem, we seized on the 
case as a vehicle to attack the per se rule of Dr. Miles. 
Elimination of the old per se  rule is important for several reasons. Most 
obviously, there are a variety of  circumstances under which a manufacturer 
will find it cost effective to freeze price at the distribution level in order to 
stimulate rivalry among its distributors on some other parameter, usually ser- 
vice related. Second, the continued existence of  the rule seriously interferes 
with the free flow of communication between a manufacturer and his distribu- 
tors. A manufacturer’s distributors serve as his eyes and ears in the market- 
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back from him. If the dealers must be cautioned that they cannot discuss com- 
petitive circumstances such as price behavior by  other dealers, the value of 
that flow is impaired. And, since the individuals who will be party to these 
conversations are not legally trained, the scope of prohibition must be consid- 
erably broader than the scope of the problem for prophylactic reasons. Third, 
because resale price does not differ in principle from other forms of vertical 
restraint, and because it produces very much the same objective consequences 
at the downstream level, manufacturers often find it necessary to obdure the 
use of lawful vertical constraints out of  a concern that they will give rise to 
circumstances  that will constitute circumstantial  evidence of resale price main- 
tenance. Thus, the rule against RPM impairs the value of practices legalized in 
theory but not in operation by the Sylvania case. 
We won at most half a victory in the Monsanto case. The court, quite prop- 
erly on legal grounds, declined to address the issue of whether Dr. Miles should 
be overruled, finding that it had not been properly raised in the courts below. 
Although we did not win with respect to the holding, we won with respect to 
the opinion. The court recited at great length the importance of free informa- 
tion flows and, to protect them, articulated an evidentiary standard for showing 
the existence of agreement that, in the great majority of cases, will be difficult 
for plaintiffs to meet. 
The final “policy effort” of  my tenure was one of more symbolic than real 
importance, and our efforts encountered total failure. This was the effort to 
persuade the Federal Communications  Commission (FCC) to abandon regula- 
tions adopted pursuant to motion picture industry lobbying that fenced the tele- 
vision networks out of the syndication market, the so-called financial syndica- 
tion  restriction rules.  In  a  benighted effort of  the late  1970s, the Justice 
Department also obtained judicial consent decrees that parallel the FCC regu- 
lations in their terms. We  were fully prepared to seek the termination of the 
consent decrees and were fairly confident that we could have been successful 
in that. But there was no point in making the effort if  the FCC could not be 
persuaded to take parallel action. Formal contacts with the FCC made it clear 
that that agency was prepared to end the restrictions if the administration took 
a clear position in favor of that course. The motion picture industry intervened 
at the White House, and the question was eventually decided there. To put the 
matter bluntly, I was invited to debate the question before the president in the 
Oval Office against Charlton Heston. I have lost many arguments that I should 
have won, but never one to so vacuous an opponent. That episode was one of 
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3.  Harry A4. Reasoner 
Phillip Areeda has done a splendid job of describing antitrust policies in the 
1980s. With that background, I have been asked to address briefly the factors 
that shaped antitrust policy in the 1980s from the perspective of a practitioner. 
My practice during the 1980s involved antitrust counseling,  the trial of antitrust 
cases for both plaintiffs and defendants, and active participation in the Ameri- 
can Bar Association Section of  Antitrust Law, of  which I served as chair in 
In addressing this topic, I want to treat antitrust as a national competition 
policy to produce and protect efficient markets-a  definition comprehending 
significantly more than the topics we often pigeonhole under the rubric of anti- 
trust policy. I will discuss briefly what I perceive in broad terms to be the five 
most significant factors that shaped policy in the Reagan Era. 
1989-90. 
The Compartmentalized Approach to Competition Policy 
Modem American politics is marked by  compartmentalized thinking. For 
example, many see no intellectual tension between blanket condemnation of 
welfare policies and support of agricultural subsidies. This same type of com- 
partmentalized thinking has driven our approach to competition policy and our 
definition of the proper sphere of antitrust. Thus, while the Reagan administra- 
tion proclaimed the importance of free markets and competition, it simultane- 
ously promoted market-distorting and anticompetitive policies. For example, 
so heavily did the administration’s 198  1 tax bill subsidize  real estate investment 
that the Treasury would have realized a net gain if  all real estate taxes had 
simply been abolished. Capital was diverted from productive uses. The tremen- 
dous overbuilding in real estate, the collapse of those markets, and the resultant 
impact on financial institutions illustrate vividly the costs of economically un- 
sound distortion of capital markets. Yet so cabined is our approach to competi- 
tion policy that no input was sought, considered, or proffered from the federal 
agencies responsible for competition policy (see Reasoner 1990, 65-67).’ 
Similarly, “antitrust” merger analysis is usually conducted as if the tax laws 
did not exist rather than often being the most important factor involved (Rea- 
soner 1990,66-67). Some would suggest that, viewing competition across the 
entire range of governmental activity, our economy ended the 1980s more cir- 
cumscribed by governmental intervention than it began, particularly when the 
amount of trade subject to international restraints, such as “voluntary” quotas, 
is considered (Muris 1989,56-57). 
1. Our comparative advantage for a number of years after World War Il  was so great that we 
were not compelled to develop a sound competition policy in order to be prosperous (see Global 
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The Greater Role of Economic Learning 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the courts, which make much of our antitrust 
policy, have become increasingly receptive to economic learning.’ The Chi- 
cago School, of  course, has been an enormous influence. This has occurred 
both because the Chicago School espouses an intellectually elegant and coher- 
ent system and because some of its proponents have matched Saint Paul in zeal 
and output (see, e.g., Posner and Easterbrook 1980; and Posner 1976).’ 
Further, and perhaps most important, Chicago School adherents have ex- 
pressed their views in ways that lawyers and judges think they can understand. 
Economic theory is persuasive to courts and lawyers only when it is accessible 
from their intellectual framework. Prior to the growth of a persuasive body of 
economic writings accessible to lawyers and judges, courts and practitioners 
were often prey to arguments based on the mechanical use of precedents that 
made no sense either in economic theory or, for that matter, from the perspec- 
tive of any logical policy. 
One of the most significant developments in the acceptance of  economic 
analysis has been the publication of  Areeda’s great treatise, Antitrust  Law, 
(197%). It provides a comprehensive theoretical treatment of antitrust law. Its 
genius is that it melds economic theory with a legal analysis of cases that law- 
yers and judges can follow and convert into briefs and opinions. Much as Scott 
(1989) has informed the law of trusts and Wigmore (1985) the law of evidence, 
Antitrust Law has informed the thinking of antitrust lawyers and the courts. 
The Reagan Administration’s Minimalist Approach to Antitrust Policy 
The 1980s began with a consensus that antitrust policy had developed a 
number of economically irrational excesses. In the 1960s and 1970s,  terminat- 
ing inefficient distributors had become a hazardous business with a spurious 
antitrust suit often part of  the transaction costs; the tying doctrine had been 
taken to absurd conceptual  extreme^;^ trivial mergers were atta~ked;~  predatory 
pricing cases could be made against the price competition of new competitors 
with no market power$ conspiracy charges could be made against a single firm 
and its own subsidiaries.’ 
William Baxter, as the first head of  the Reagan administration’s Antitrust 
2. See Continental T.V., Inc. v.  GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 US.  36 (1977); and Calvani (1990). 
3. Easterbrook and Posner alone are cited some 145 times in the Index fo  Legal  Periodicals 
during the 1980s. I do not address the question of how completely Chicago School theory captures 
the real factors that drive behavior in our markets. For example, tax policy, which is often a critical 
determinant, is not often addressed. Our ability to verify empirically theories in this area is still 
very limited (see Bok 1960,228,240-47). 
4. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, 429 U.S. 610 (1977). 
5. United States v.  Von’s  Grocery Co., 384 U.S.  270 (1966). 
6. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S.  685 (1967). 
7. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.  International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42  (1968). 617  Antitrust Policy 
Division, in a brilliant series of speeches and amicus briefs (Baxter 1984) ac- 
complished splendid successes in antitrust reform contributing to the mitiga- 
tion or elimination of many of these flaws in the law. 
Unfortunately, the administration’s  efforts at remaking antitrust law were not 
limited to Assistant Attorney General Baxter’s elegantly reasoned efforts. After 
Baxter and Attorney General William French Smith left Washington, Secretary 
of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and Attorney General Ed Meese, apparently 
in the belief that antitrust enforcement was not important to the functioning of 
competitive markets, sought to diminish dramatically the role of the antitrust 
laws. Antitrust bashing-incredibly  ignoring tax policy, monetary policy, and 
relative capital costs and blaming the antitrust laws for our problems in interna- 
tional  competition-was  fashionable  rhetoric  for  administration  officials 
throughout the remainder of  the 1980s. Both the Antitrust Division and the 
Federal Trade Commission were reduced to approximately half their former 
size and resources during the 1980s (see “Report. . .  on the Antitrust Division” 
1990, 750, n. 2; and “Kirkpatrick Committee Report” 1989, 105). 
Critical to compliance with our antitrust laws is the belief of businessmen 
that these laws are important and will be enforced. As with the tax laws, we 
depend on voluntary observance. At the end of the 1980s,  most antitrust prac- 
titioners felt that the importance of antitrust compliance had been dangerously 
reduced in the eyes of businessmen (see “Report . . .  on the Antitrust Division” 
1990, 749). When divorced from populism, antitrust has no natural political 
constituency. Few businessmen want competition for themselves. In general, 
they are pleased to receive tax breaks, subsidies, quotas, and tariffs and to 
enjoy minimal competition. Businessmen read, not the Antitrust Division’s rea- 
soned arguments for reform, but the hyperbolic antienforcement rhetoric of 
Meese and Baldrige, reinforced by the cheerleading of  the Wall Street Jour- 
nal. The perceived administration hostility toward antitrust enforcement, the 
slashing of the enforcement agencies’ budgets, and the diminution in private 
enforcement led many to believe that they could basically ignore the antitrust 
laws.8 
The Decline of Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws 
The effect of a perceived decline of government enforcement of the antitrust 
laws was accentuated by a diminution in the ability of private plaintiffs to bring 
suits to enforce the antitrust laws. One of the consequences of economic learn- 
ing was that the courts started to move away from bright line per se rules of 
illegality and to apply economic analysis under the “rule of reason” (see Crane 
1987, 16-19).  When courts apply a sophisticated economic analysis in as- 
sessing practices, those that are not competitively harmful or that are even 
8. Thus, the Conference Board thought it appropriate to hold a conference entitled “Is Antitrust 
Dead?” The answer, on balance, was no, but note that the question was considered worth asking. 618  Harry M. Reasoner 
competitively  beneficial  may  be  saved.  The  arguably  greater  precision 
achieved was expensive from the viewpoint of the administration of justice. A 
court is a very difficult, costly, and uncertain place to conduct an economic 
analysis. It is costly and risky for a plaintiff to try a rule of reason case, so 
there is a real disincentive for plaintiffs to attack any practice where the rule 
of reason will be applied. 
Further, the standing rules were modified to narrow the class of those who 
can bring suit to enforce the antitrust laws9  Competitors,  who ordinarily might 
be the only ones who could afford to attack a merger, were held not to have 
standing to do so in most circumstances.IO  Assume a merger that we can be 
positive will hurt consumers. Merger litigation is very resource intensive, and 
the resources of the Antitrust Division are limited. The Antitrust Division must 
carefully limit the cases it brings. It cannot begin to attack every merger. Since 
consumers cannot normally afford to attack mergers, restricting the ability of 
competitors to sue results in a serious diminution in those who are in a position 
to enforce the antitrust laws (see Hovenkamp 1989). 
The Emphasis on Federalism 
As the federal government was being perceived to leave a lacuna in antitrust 
enforcement, state attorneys general moved into it. The only natural political 
constituency of antitrust is a kind of populism. Many of these state attorneys 
general made emotional appeals to this constituency. It is difficult to say how 
much difference the increased state activity will make. Bringing traditional 
price-fixing suits will not make a great difference because the resources of the 
states are limited. However, they have moved into more significant areas. For 
example, seventeen states have  sued in federal court in California attacking 
the casualty insurance industry for allegedly conspiring to eliminate pollution 
coverage and occurrence policies.Il They seek to reform the way that a segment 
of the insurance industry is operating worldwide. The case could be very sig- 
nificant. Because the seventeen states have filed within the federal system, in 
theory at least any adjudicated result will be consistent with federal policy. 
But Texas has taken the next step and done what a sophisticated result- 
oriented plaintiff would do. Texas did not file in federal court in California. It 
filed in state court in Texas.I2 If  the states routinely begin to use their state 
court systems to bring cases of  potentially national structural significance, 
9. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990); ABA 
10. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. 479 U.S.  104 (1986). 
11. In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.  Supp. 464  (N.D. Cal. 1989), appeal docketed, 
12. See Texas v. Insurance Services Office, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 601 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (remanding 
Antitrust Section (1984, 1988). 
No. C-88-1688-WWF  (9th Cir. 2 December 1989). 
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there could be a real problem of a Balkanized competitive policy. The Supreme 
Court’s bias is toward federalism. The Sherman Act is not broadly preemptive 
(“Report . . .  to Review” 1990). A fractionated national policy could be partic- 
ularly troublesome in the merger area. States could be motivated to attack 
mergers to protect local employment, local corporate headquarters, and other 
reasons inconsistent with efficient national markets. 
As the states have  become more aggressive, conflicts have developed be- 
tween state and federal policy. First, and most serious, is the manipulation of 
state and municipal governments to create regulatory schemes that insulate 
industries from competition. Businesses can get immunity from the federal 
antitrust laws by going to the state legislature and, for example, having it create 
a state board of hairdressers that regulates the hairdressing market. Prices can 
then be raised, using the board as an effective barrier to entry and protection 
against antitrust attack.I3 This type of costly anticompetitive conduct has pro- 
liferated in the states. Perhaps constrained by political pressure, the state attor- 
neys general have not shown initiative in opposing it. 
Another problem is that, theoretically, if we return to an era of national liti- 
gation in the price-fixing area, a producer could be held liable both under the 
federal laws to the direct purchaser of the goods and under the state laws to the 
indirect purchaser (who purchased the same goods from the direct purchaser), 
so a company could wind up paying six times for damages caused by  one 
o~ercharge.~~  It would be very difficult for a company to get a fair defense if 
faced with the in terrorem possibility of sextuple damages. 
From a broad perspective, these five factors-compartmentalization,  the as- 
cendance of  economic theory, the administration’s minimalist approach, the 
decline of private enforcement, and the emphasis on federalism-begin  to ex- 
plain what developed in the area of antitrust law during the Reagan administra- 
tion. In antitrust, however, as in other areas of the law, Holmes’s dictum re- 
mains valid: The life of the law is not logic. 
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Summary of Discussion 
William Baxter agreed with Reasoner that Reagan administration policy had 
shifted to an extreme position against antitrust enforcement, but he believed 
that this shift did not occur under Doug Ginsburg, Baxter’s successor as head 
of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. He suggested that the change 
in tone was initiated by a separate group during the time of Ginsburg’s succes- 
sor, Harry Reasoner agreed with Baxter. Baxter also pointed out that the anti- 
trust bar had not supported his efforts, perhaps because antitrust enforcement 
had made millionaires of many of them. 
Phillip Areeda raised three issues. First, he said that the interaction of  state 
and federal antitrust law is going to become an important issue in the 1990s. 
The Supreme Court has ducked this problem so far, but, with more intensive 
enforcement of State antitrust law, the question of whether state or federal anti- 
trust law should dictate national policy will have to be faced. Second, he said 
that the role of  economists in the development and improvement of  antitrust 
law has become very significant and that their contributions will no doubt be 
enduring. Finally, he repeated the concern in his paper that so much policy- 
making in antitrust is left to judges, who seem often unqualified for the task. 
But, considering the tax policy-making process discussed in another session of 
the conference, he felt that turning antitrust policy back to the president and 
Congress might not be a good idea after all. 
Paul Joskow thought that there had been dramatic changes in antitrust policy 
in the 1980s and that Baxter’s three-year term had set a standard that still ap- 621  Antitrust Policy 
plies. Effectively, Baxter put up a sign in his office reading, “No More Mush.” 
His approach to mergers, vertical restraints, and predation demonstrated that 
the Justice Department’s role in antitrust enforcement was to look for business 
practices that created and enhanced market power, not to stomp on business 
behavior and organizational forms that enhanced efficiency and led to lower 
prices but might simultaneously have hurt some individual competitors. 
Joskow’s sense was  that economists’ role in the Justice Department in- 
creased greatly during the 1980s, perhaps at the expense of  the lawyers-the 
lawyers were even required to take an economics course. Also, the Merger 
Guidelines developed by Baxter in 1982 and revised in 1984 have been influ- 
ential beyond merger policy: they  have refined the questions asked by  the 
courts in antitrust analysis more generally, especially in terms of defining mar- 
kets and market power. 
The courts changed as well in the 1980s. As Areeda emphasized in his pa- 
per, President Reagan appointed a large number of judges, several of whom 
were law  professors specializing in antitrust: Richard Posner, Frank Easter- 
brook, and Stephen Breyer. Their decisions have been very influential because 
they state clearly what the economic issue is and how to address it. It has been 
very important to other judges, for whom antitrust cases can be confusing and 
difficult to understand, to have some clear decisions to guide them. 
Joskow thought that these changes in the courts were also important to keep 
in mind when evaluating the effect of  Justice Department antitrust policy in 
the 1980s. Although the Justice Department is often criticized for not having 
vigorously enforced Section 7 of the Clayton Act, people do not usually men- 
tion that, while in the 1960s and 1970s the Justice Department never lost in 
court, now it almost never wins. The courts are simply much less receptive to 
the Justice Department’s opposition to mergers. Further, the changes in anti- 
trust policy due to changes in the courts are likely to be more long lasting than 
changes due to the actions of a particular administration. 
Christopher DeMuth responded to Feldstein’s earlier question about how 
one can account for the successes and failures of economic thinking in influ- 
encing policy. He suggested that antitrust was the area of  regulation where 
economic thinking has had the most practical influence-because,  he believed, 
there is very little organized interest group politics in antitrust policy. It is hard 
to identify a group in the economy that has a large immediate stake in either a 
strengthening or a relaxing of merger policy. Thus, scholarly thinking has more 
influence in antitrust because it enjoys more free rein than in areas such as 
health and safety regulation. In the one area in which there are groups with a 
clear  stake in  government policy-the  area  of  restrictive distribution sys- 
tems-Baxter  and other reformers have had the least success. 
Reasoner agreed with DeMuth in part, but suggested also that the historical 
way of dealing with antitrust laws has been not to try to change them but to try 
to get around them. Attacking the sugar trust led to sugar subsidies and sugar 
quotas-effectively,  government cartels that are far more efficient than private 622  Summary of Discussion 
cartels. Similarly,  the tobacco trust was attacked, and antitrust law cannot touch 
the kind of subsidies received by the tobacco industry today. In cases such as 
these, special interest groups have taken themselves beyond the influence of 
antitrust laws. 
James Burnley  wanted to set the historical record straight on two points. 
First, in 1983, when the act governing the Department of Transportation’s role 
in merger regulation was being debated, Secretary Elizabeth Dole argued that 
Transportation should not have the oversight responsibility on airline mergers. 
The Justice Department did not take an active role in the debate, whereas the 
airline industry took particular interest in making sure the responsibility fell 
on Transportation, as in the end it did. 
Second, only two or three of the mergers that were approved by  the DOT 
were questioned at all by  the Justice Department. One of those was the pur- 
chase of Eastern Airlines by Texas Air, which at the time still owned New York 
Air. This acquisition would have created a tremendous problem on the shuttle 
routes, and for this reason Transportation rejected the merger. The merger was 
approved only on resubmission of the application after New York Air had sold 
its shuttle service to Pan Am. 
David Stockman wondered what the harm was in those mergers. 
Burnley replied that, although the Northwest-Republic merger did not result 
in unforeseen problems in his view, the TWA-Ozark merger did create a prob- 
lem in St. Louis because those two carriers controlled an overwhelming num- 
ber of gates at St. Louis under very long-term leases. The department may not 
have fully understood the underlying facts regarding the St. Louis airport when 
they reviewed that merger. He suggested that there are alternatives available to 
assure competition in the St. Louis market, such as converting Scott Air Force 
base to commercial use. 
Elizabeth Bailey noted that most of the discussion had focused on economic 
policy from 1980 to 1987. She opened the question of how policy had changed 
toward the end of the decade. One case of particular interest was the Justice 
Department’s inquiry regarding scholarship setting by academic institutions. 
Areeda suggested that the Justice Department’s inquiry into tuition setting 
by academic institutions is sound policy. If they are fixing tuitions, that would 
be a violation of  antitrust laws and detrimental to the country. On the scholar- 
ship side, he believed that scholarship fixing may be perfectly lawful under 
antitrust law. Areeda said that the inquily is troubling because it appears that 
the government has pursued its investigation without first formulating a theory. 
They seem to believe that a theory will emerge only after they collect the facts, 
but it seems more efficient to do it the other way around. 
More generally, Areeda argued that the present antitrust chief, Jim Rill, is a 
“sound pragmatist.” Rill is sensitive to the economic reforms effected by the 
Reagan administration  but also ready to consider alternatives-ready  to think, 
for example, that perhaps there should be restraints on leasing airline computer 
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merger guidelines than his predecessors had been, but overall there does not 
seem to have been a fundamental change in antitrust policy in the late 1980s. 
Joskow concurred, adding that there had been three minor changes under 
Rill. First, the power in making decisions has shifted back toward the lawyers 
in the Justice Department and away from the economists, a shift that is consis- 
tent with their pursuing the case against colleges without an initial theory. Sec- 
ond, Jim Rill has been very sensitive to the problems with the state attorneys 
general and has been striving to mend relations with them. Third, the Justice 
Department is requiring merger applicants to supply much more information 
so that it can abide by the Merger Guidelines as they were written. 
Reasoner argued that mergers in the United States have been driven by tax 
law. The government has created an arbitrage situation where one can change 
equity into debt and obtain tax advantages. The double taxation of corporate 
dividends is a great mistake because it biases corporate finance toward heavy 
debt, which can cripple the competitive staying power of U.S. companies, es- 
pecially during recessions. The United States went through a period in which 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs) changed hundreds of millions of dollars from equity 
to debt, and, during this recession, the public is having to pay for that. 
Lionel Olmer asked Baxter to comment on the role of the Justice Depart- 
ment in intervening on behalf of IBM with the European Community (EC) and 
to comment generally on the application of our antitrust laws outside domes- 
tic territory. 
Baxter responded that the IBM situation arose from an EC requirement that 
IBM engage in “predisclosure.” Predisclosure is a “nutty notion,” originating 
in the 1970s, that large and successful companies that made products that were 
subject to competition in complementary markets had an obligation to predis- 
close technological changes in the central good. This predisclosure would 
allow the competitors of the complementary goods to be ready to meet the new 
product in the marketplace the day it was unveiled. Kodak, for example, had 
an obligation to predisclose new film technology so that competitive makers 
of cameras could have a headstart making cameras that used the new film. In 
the IBM case, the EC felt that IBM had an obligation to predisclose new tech- 
nology with respect to CPUs in order to benefit the European manufacturers 
of  peripheral equipment. This action was apparently prompted by  the CEO 
of Memorex. 
Areeda added that no court had adopted predisclosure yet, and Baxter con- 
curred. 
Litan noted that, while the courts and the legal profession have undergone a 
revolution in the adoption of economic analysis, the International Trade Com- 
mission’s (ITC) decisions over the 1980s did not display a similar trend. Only 
a few commissioners applied economic reasoning in their decisions. Although 
the ITC considers many of the same issues, such as defining the relevant mar- 
ket, there are virtually no references to the antitrust revolution in the ITC liter- 
ature. 624  Summary of Discussion 
Paula Stern agreed that different members of the International Trade Com- 
mission have displayed different tolerances for economic analysis. She noted 
that the ITC had heard presentations from the Federal Trade Commission and 
the Justice Department in the steel cases of the early 1980s. These presenta- 
tions had failed to provide clear links, however, between the material presented 
and its implications for the ITC’s decisions. 
Stem asked for specific comment on the steel antitrust cases of  the early 
1980s, raising the question of whether different outcomes of the Justice De- 
partment’s review of those cases would have been better for the industry. 
Buxter recalled the LTV/Republic merger, which Secretary of Commerce 
Malcolm Baldrige had supported but which Baxter had opposed. About two 
weeks  after Baxter left office, Baldrige prevailed, and the merger was  ap- 
proved. William Niskanen clarified that the most immediate action after Baxter 
left was a disapproval of the merger issued by Paul McGrath. The decision was 
later reversed after Baldrige and the president made public remarks critical of 
the first decision. 
Martin Feldstein asked the discussants to address the rationale underlying 
the decision. 
Baxter explained that, even if  LTV  was viewed as a failing firm, it was too 
big to be allowed to merge and form a larger company. Further, he argued, 
there were less offensive purchasers available. 
Stockman noted the context of the LTV/Republic merger. It was approved in 
the spring of  1984, when there was a massive inflow of  steel imports, both 
because the dollar was so high and in anticipation of protectionist trade policy. 
Steel imports represented 26 percent of the market, while the merging of LTV 
and Republic would have joined pieces holding 9 percent and 11 percent, re- 
spectively. Since that time, however, Republic LTV has been broken down into 
four companies, two of which are owned by  the Japanese. Stockman asked 
what the long-term harm of  the merger could be, given the context of  such 
strong world competition. 
Banter responded that he had been urged by the White House to view steel 
as a world market, despite the likelihood of  quotas being imposed. He had 
argued that the existence or importance of  a world market depends on the 
amount of protectionism in place. For example, in a protected domestic market 
where quotas are determined as a percentage of domestic output, attempts by 
domestic producers to restrict output and raise price will simultaneously create 
a decrease in imports. In this situation, there is not a competitive world market. 
Areeda added that now, ten years after the LTV merger, we know that it had 
no anticompetitive effects and that no market power was achieved, as demon- 
strated by the split-up of the company. But this does not mean that disapprov- 
ing the merger would have been wrong at the time. For all kinds of decisions, 
the question is whether they are wise at the time they are made, so in antitrust 
one has to judge the market at the time a merger is proposed. If one believes 
that a merger consolidates a substantial part of the market or makes tacit coor- 625  Antitrust Policy 
dination between oligopolists more likely, the government should prevent that. 
The legal standard says that the purpose of the antimerger statute is to prevent 
potentially dangerous transactions. The fact that a merger turns out all right 
does not necessarily bear on the wisdom of the initial decision. 
Stockman countered that the outcome was predictable. At  the time of  the 
LTVRepublic merger decision, the steel market had 50 million tons of overca- 
pacity,  imports were large, and the domestic industry was unraveling. The 
structure of the industry at that time said that no possible market power could 
be accumulated or sustained. 
Stockman said that, in his experience buying companies, he had looked at 
200 potential acquisitions since 1987. Of the 200 companies, 175 claimed to 
have a market share of 45 percent or more, and this can be completely true 
depending on the way the market is defined: if you define the market as your 
product, you have  a 100 percent market share. However, there is capital and 
technology today that can bear  on almost any tradable goods market from 
around the world. Consequently, one cannot find a market where market power 
can be established and sustained for any appreciable period of time. He con- 
cluded that antitrust doctrine is obsolete. 
Areeda said there was an element of truth in Stockman’s argument. There is 
a great deal of competition and substitutability, so entry is not always blocked. 
Antitrust law is supposed to take these considerations into account, but a case- 
by-case review would really be needed to argue the point. His larger objection 
to Stockman’s point was that Stockman comes close to saying that we don’t 
need antitrust law because all markets “take care of themselves” in the long 
run. Areeda is not as confident that this happens, and, further, much injury can 
result before anticompetitive distortions are ultimately corrected. 
Buxter agreed with Areeda and added that the right question is not whether 
entry is possible but whether the conditions of  the industry make entry eco- 
nomically attractive. It really does not matter how contestable a market is if 
there are no profits there to attract new investment. Particularly in an industry 
like steel, which was in very serious financial difficulty, one was unlikely to 
see entry as a practical matter. Therefore, how easy it was to enter the steel 
industry under those circumstances was quite irrelevant. 
Reasoner disagreed with Stockman, arguing that many companies do pos- 
sess market power. Niskanen suggested that perhaps the proper test  is not 
whether antitrust policy will do good but whether it is likely to do more good 
than harm. On that question, he believed, the jury is still out. This Page Intentionally Left Blank